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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently the rights of prisoners have been an area of law ne-
glected by both the courts and legal commentators. In the last few years,
however, more has been written on the subject than ever before; and the
courts have begun to intervene in prison administrative decisions, recogniz-
ing rights of inmates that were previously denied them. This article ex-
amines legal rights of prisoners and discusses whether the courts have gone
far enough in recognizing rights that prisoners retain upon entering a
penal institution.
During the last 20 years two significant cases with partially conflicting
theories have been cited by many courts in their discussions of internal
prison rights of inmates. Often when a court has denied a right' it has
referred to the theory enunciated in dicta from Price v. Johnston2 :
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal... of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underly-
ing our penal system.3
But the conflicting theory often used to justify recognition of a prisoner's
claim4 appears in dicta from Coffin v. Reichard:"
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those ex-
pressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.0
The Coffin view presumes that no rights are taken from an inmate unless
correctional officials succeed in proving a strong need for so doing. It is
submitted that this is to be preferred over the Price approach, even though
they differ only in emphasis.
The Price theory places the burden on the inmate to show why he de-
serves a right and serves as authority for the denial of various rights to
inmates. Nevertheless, both Coffin and Price involve the same kind of con-
siderations: under Coffin one must discover what rights are by necessary
implication removed, while under Price one must examine the considera-
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1 See United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1956).
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4 See Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R. 1970).
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tions which justify a limitation of inmate rights. Because essentially the
same considerations underly the recognition of prisoners' rights under either
theory, it seems anomalous that one case serves as authority for the denial
of various rights and the other for recognition of thera. Under either test a
court must undoubtedly weigh the considerations on each side, perhaps
in the form of a balancing test, to arrive at the appropriate conclusion.
Indeed, the courts should ask whether the purposes of the penal system-
deterrence, retribution, community safety, and rehabilitation-and the re-
sources of the prison, along with the safety of its personnel and the consid-
eration of basic constitutional values, justify the withdrawal of an indi-
vidual right from an inmate.' This the courts have too seldom done.
To the extent that the Coffin rationale differs from its Price counterpart,
this article adopts it as the preferred view because it places upon the state
the burden to show the necessity for withdrawing any individual right
from an inmate and seems to presume the loss of fewer rights than does
the Price view. Many courts today seem to be adopting this position. In
addition, there are a number of other reasons for preferring the Coffin view.
A. The Coffin Rationale Is Preferred
The eroding strain of legal theory that denoted a prisoner as a "slave
of the State' 8 can no longer be justified. A number of reasons underly
the emerging acceptance of the Coffin reasoning as the preferred view of
prisoner's rights and the rejection of the slave doctrine.
1. The American Legal Tradition Presumes that
Individual Rights are Retained
The Declaration of Independence long ago stated the belief that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness." That document had its basis in the Western intellectual tra-
dition, which emphasizes the intrinsic worth of the individual and the
retention of individual rights.' In Mill's famous essay, On Liberty, the
thesis which emerges is based on this tradition and argues for limiting the
power which can legitimately be exercised by society over the individual.
Moreover, the principle toward which the argument moves is still accepted,
that is, the essential importance of human development in its richest di-
versity.10
7 Courts often use the Price dicta as authority for denial of a right with the justification that
denial is in the best interests of security and discipline within the institution. But this analysis
is inadequate without an examination of how security and discipline are affected.
SRuffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
9 See generalty MILL, On Liberty, ESSAYS (1935); C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OV
THE 18TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1935).
10 43 GREAT BooKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 267 (1952).
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This intellectual and political theory is not limited to some groups,
while excluding others such as prisoners. As the TAsK FORCE REPORT
commented:
A first tenet of our governmental, religious, and ethical tradition is the in-
trinsic worth of every individual no matter how degenerate. It is a radi-
cal departure from that tradition to accept for a defined class of persons,
even criminals, a regime in which their right to liberty is determined by
officials wholly unaccountable in the exercise of their power....n
George Bernard Shaw echoed this tradition in The Crhne of Imprison-
ment,1 2 in which he concluded that imprisonment cannot be fully under-
stood by those who do not understand freedom:
Any specific liberty which the criminal's specific defect lead him to abuse,
will, no doubt, be taken from him; but if his life is spared his right to
live must be accepted in the fullest sense, and not, as at present, merely
as a right to breathe and circulate his blood. In short, a criminal should
be treated, not as a man who has forfeited all normal rights and liberties
by the breaking of a single law, but as one who, through some specific
weakness or weaknesses, is incapable of exercising some specific liberty or
liberties.13
2. The Coffin View is Preferred in Terms of the Overriding
Correctional Rationale of Rehabilitation
"The ultimate goal of corrections under any theory is to make the
community safer by reducing the incidence of crime. Rehabilitation of
offenders to prevent their return to crime is in general the most promising
way to achieve this end.' '1 4 This position concisely states the focus of the
Crime Commission's work in the Task Force Report. The entire emphasis
that consistently appears throughout its pages is that in order to achieve
the benefits of rehabilitation of the "collaborative regime," the inmates
should be treated more humanely and should retain a greater number of
individual freedoms. Although imprisonment requires a certain amount
of regimentation that is unavoidable in an enforced community (as Coffin
recognizes), "[flew criminologists would disagree with the proposition
that any additional amount of deprivation imposed on prisoners is unne-
cessary or even detrimental and should, therefore be avoided."'"
Indeed, after reading a work like Menninger's The Crime of Punish-
"THE PREsIDENT'S CO,ussIoN ON LAW ENFORCEM'ENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTIcE, TAsK FORcE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
12 G. SHAw, THE Cmrm OF IMm soemiENT (1946).
13Id. at 124.
14 TAsK FoRCE REPORT: supra note 11, at 16. See Nolan v. Smith No. 6228 (D. Vt. June
29, 1967) where Circuit Judge Oakes, sitting by designation, said, "There is no question that re-
habilitation, not revenge, must be the principle aim of penology."
15Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L REV. 58, 73 (1966).
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ment' one comes to the realization that the majority of practices in our
prisons, which today limit the rights of inmates and regiment their lives,
only dehumanize and destroy and are in no way rationally related to
rehabilitation. Thus, Menninger concludes that imprisonment "is a creak-
ing, groaning monster through whose heartless jaws hundreds of American
citizens grind daily, to be maimed and embittered so that they emerge
implacable enemies of the social order and confirmed in their 'criminal-
ity.' ""f This denial of many rights retained by free man gives impetus to
his contention that:
The psychological state of complete passivity and dependence on decisions
of guards and officers ... [tQhe frustation of the prisoner's ability to
make choices . .. involve a profound threat to the weak, helpless, depen-
dent status of childhood .... The imprisoned criminal finds his picture of
himself as a self determining individual being destroycd by the regime of
custodians.'s
Consequently, when one realizes that a harsh, custodial regime, where
a prisoner is bereft of most rights, does not effectively rehabilitate,1" one
sees that we must alter our prisons to be more human and more like our
open, free society if we are to meet our burden of rehabilitation.20  The
Chief Justice of the United States has epitomized our duty:
We take on a burden when we put a man behind walls and that burden
is to give him a chance to change. If we deny him that, we deny his
status as a human being, and to deny that is to diminih our own human-
ity and plant seeds of future anguish for ourselves.2"
3. The Coffin View May Further the Processes of
Orderly Correctional Administration
Recent prison riots throughout the country suggest that repressive, cus-
todial practices of incarceration will no longer be tolerated by prisoners.
Thus, a recent study challenges the traditional theory that tight control of
prisoners is needed and that many individual rights must be suppressed in
order to operate prisons; instead, it suggests that perhaps the opposite is
true, pointing to the many recent prison riots in institutions run in the tra-
ditional manner.'
The Task Force Report23 suggests that the emphasis on the authoritarian
K. YMENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
17 Id. at 89.
18Id. at 74-75.
19 See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11.
20 See W. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR PRISONS AND PAROLE SYsTEM, (1964).
21 From a speech by Chief Justice Burger to the A.B.A., reported in the Boston Globe, Feb.
21, 1971, at 6-A, col. 1.
22 From tentative conclusions of a Study of the Adult Correctional Institution at Cranston,
R.I., by the Harvard Criminal Justice Center. To be published in J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
2 3 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11.
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nature of prisons leads to a subculture of inmate relationships "founded
on violence and corruption."24  Moreover, it suggests that the develop-
ment of myriad rules and strict enforcement of them leads to inmate ef-
forts to avoid them, so that these prison regulations "do not clearly de-
crease the amount of disorderly or even dangerous bebavior."2" Conse-
quently, much administrative time is wasted in monitoring the deprivation
of rights to little or no apparent benefit. Therefore, the Task Force Re-
port concludes, consistent with the Coffin v. Reckhard"0 theory, that grant-
ing inmates more rights is a preferred practice in terms of orderly prison
administration:
Therefore, a first principle for any correctional institution is that staff
control can be greatest, and certainly inmate life will be most relevant to
that in the free community, if rules regulating behavior are as dose as
possible to those which would be essential for law and order in any free
community, together with such minimal additional rules as are essential
to meet the conditions peculiar to the institution.27
B. There is a Trend Toward Recognition of the Coffin Vieu
of Inmate Rights
In the last few years many courts have accepted the outlook suggested
by Coffin and have added to the general trend toward the expansion of
internal prison legal rights for inmates. Quite often this has resulted in
a court's intervention, or review of, the decisions of correctional admin-
istrators. Although this article is not directly concerned with that trend,
but rather with the considerations indicating what legally enforceable rights
inmates should and do possess, nevertheless a brief look at the reasons for
this increased intervention and recognition of rights will place the entire
discussion in better perspective.
1. Increased Use of the 1871 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
by Inmates Has Expanded the Scope of Their Protected Rights
Before 1961, any complaint alleging the denial of a right brought by
a state prisoner generally had first to be litigated in a state court2 8 How-
ever, in that year Pierce v. LaVallee 29 held that a suit brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which alleged the impairment of religious freedom would
not automatically be denied a hearing in federal court. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court in Cooper v. Pate0 appeared to reject the abstention doc-
241d. at 47.
251d. at 50.
26143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
27 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 50.
28 6 Can. L BULL. § 2 (June 1970).
29293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
3o 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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trine in § 1983 prisoner actions,3 ' and in Houighton v. Shafer,32 the Court
finally declared that exhaustion was not applicable to such suits. These
declarations have made it much easier for a state prisoner to present his
claims before a federal court and have made this statute the preferable
form of action for a state prisoner33 because the exhaustion doctrine in
habeas corpus actions still exists and because some courts still adhere to the
total release rule. Moreover, because the Second Circuit has upheld the
judgment of compensatory damages against a prison warden in Sostre v.
McGinnis,3 4 more § 1983 suits seeking damages than in the past can be
expected-another reason why state prisoners might prefer this form of
action. Other reasons for the increased recognition of rights under § 1983
are the recognition of the intent of the 1971 Civil Rights Act to include
relief in this kind of case, the increased emphasis on inmate rehabilitation,
and judicial notice of inadequate prison conditions.St
2. The Recognition of Rights for the
Disadvantaged is a Societal Trend
Increased intervention in prison administration by the courts can be seen
as part of the recent judicial trend to examine and expand the constitu-
tional rights of many disadvantaged groups in society. Recognizing the
rights of black persons, 36 students, 7 welfare recipients,38 servicemen, " '
draftees, 40 juveniles, 41 women,42 and mental patients43 evidences a societal
trend toward greater concern for the disadvantaged. It would be surpris.
ing, therefore, if prisoners were omitted from this trend.
31 6 OM. L BULL. § 2 (June 1970).
32392 U.S. 639 (1968).
3 Section 1983 does not apply to prisoners in federal custody. Recently, the Second Circuit
placed some restrictions on such a suit when it ruled, in a case where the district court ordered a
restoration of "good time" resulting in the plaintiff's release from custody in a § 1983 suit, that
the plaintiff had to exhaust his remedies--since the suit sought relief from custody, it was essen-
tually a habeas corpus action, and the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement could not be cir-
cumvented. Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 9 CR. L RnIp. 2050 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1971); accord,
United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971) (habeas corpus Is not
limited to attacks on custody because of defects in the original conviction, but applies to the
failure to allow release according to law). Contra, Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (I.D.
Va. 1971). For a good discussion of when exhaustion should apply in an inartfully pleaded
prisoner suit that could be interpreted as either a habeas corpus or it Civil Rights Act suit, see
Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
34 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
35 6 CRim. L BULL. § 2 (June 1970).
36 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
38 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
39 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
40 Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
4 1
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
43 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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3. "Total Release" is Adhered to Less Strictly
The courts now less frequently condition the grant of habeas corpus
relief on the "total release" doctrine and give greater recognition to its
flexibility as a remedy.4 The traditional view of "total release" was ad-
vanced in Ex parte Pickens,45 where a district court in Alaska recognized
that a filthy, 27 square foot jail holding 40 persons without adequate
facilities or ventilation was "not fit for human habitation." Nevertheless,
the court saw no remedy other than the total discharge of the petitioner
with all the other prisoners to follow-a result which it would not order
-consequently, it ordered no relief. But, numerous courts today use
habeas corpus for remedies other than total release4 Many federal courts
use the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (habeas corpus), authorizing dis-
position of a case "as law and justice require," to grant remedies such as
discharge from solitary confinement.4 7 Habeas corpus has been used also
to grant relief without release in cases dealing with freedom of religion, s
access to one's attorney in private, 9 religious dietary practices,' the abridge-
ment of access to the courts,' 1 and a rule restricting the possession of
legal papersY2 Consequently, it might easily be concluded that:
Habeas corpus is being gradually ex-panded beyond its traditional limits,
. and courts are beginning to examine the manner in which an in-
mate is held or treated even though his sentence and commitment are
concededly valid5 3
4 4 See Note, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L REV. 1038 (1970).
45 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alas. 1951). See also Exv parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193
(1830); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1944); Stroud v. Johnston, 139 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1943).
46 Perhaps Coffin was one of the first cases to use habeas corpus in this manner, when the
court recognized that: "The fact that a person is legally in prison does not prevent the use of
habeas corpus to protect his other inhrent rights." 143 F.2d at 445.
4 7 Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M LD. Tenn. 1966), rcv'd, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 8 Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (although not for past
wrongs); In re Ferguson, 55 CaL 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
49 InreRider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 P. 965 (1920).
5 0 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
51Ex pare Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
52In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
53 Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGH-CIV. LIB. L RzV. 227,
254 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob].
The Supreme Court has made it dear that habeas corpus is an appropriate method of attack-
ing conditions of confinement In Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), an inmate
brought a habeas petition attacking both the living conditions and disciplinary procedures in
prison. The Court, in reversing a denial of the petition, stated that, "Moreover, although cog-
nizable in federal habeas corpus, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), petitioner's plead-
ing may also be read to plead causes of action under the Civil Rights Act... for deprivation of
constitutional rights by prison officials." See also Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 40 U.S.LW. 2535
(2ad Cir. Jan. 25, 1972).
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4. "Hands-off" and "Federal Abstention" are Eroding
Doctrines in the Area of Prisoners' Rights
Although traditionally courts were reluctant to inquire into prison con-
ditions because of a "hands-off" or "exceptional circumstances" doctrine
which suggested deference to correctional administrators and regulations,
this doctrine now has lost much of its force. Previously, the result of this
doctrine was that "[w]hatever rationale is employed, the prisoner, because
of his status as a convict, is unable to enforce even his protected rights
absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.""' This failure to grant
relief "appears to stem from a conviction held with virtual unanimity by
the courts that it is beyond their power to review the internal management
of a prison system."' 5  Illustrating that this doctrine could prevent a court
from examining even the allegations of a complaint, the Eighth Circuit
in Williams v. Steele,0 a case in which an inmate complained of harsh
mistreatment, denied relief, blithely stating that "[s]ince the prison system
of the United States is entrusted to the Bureau of Prisons under the di-
rection of the Attorney General . the courts have no power to supervise
the discipline of the prisoners nor to interfere with their discipline. .. .
Now, however, an examination of the types of complaints being ad-
judicated and examined by the courts illustrates that the "courts [are]...
replacing the 'hands off' approach with a determination of the reasonable-
ness of the regulation." '  Less frequently do they refuse to examine a com-
plaint. For example, in Pierce v. LaVallee0 a court investigated com-
plaints of religious persecution and solitary confinement; in Barnett v'.
Rodgers0 a court scrutinized the reasonableness of an inmate's diet; and in
Sostre v. Rockefeller6' a court examined allegations of many kinds of un-
fair deprivations. Recently the Supreme Court rejected the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine in Haines v. Kerner,62 a case in which an inmate
had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure. His
§ 1983 complaint alleged a denial of due process in the steps leading to
his confinement and physical injuries suffered as result of conditions in the
isolation cell. The district court had granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss,
5 6 CRIM. L. BULL. § 2 (1970).
5 Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Court: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Rcview tho
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508 (1963).
r6 Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952).
57id. at 34. See also Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
58 Note, Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IowA L REV.
671,671-72 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note].
59 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
60 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
62 40 U.S.L.W. 4156 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1972).
(Vol. 3
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
suggesting that only under exceptional circumstances should courts inquire
into the internal operations of state penitentiaries and concluding that
petitioner had failed to show a deprivation of federally protected rights.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that prison officials are vested
with "wide discretion" in disciplinary matters.03
The Supreme Court reversed, stating, "Whatever may be the limits on the
scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, alle-
gations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded,
are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence.""4
Finally, the federal abstention doctrine that "[p]rinciples of federalism
prevent federal courts from exercising supervision over state prisons"cs
seems to be going the way of the "hands-off" doctrine. In United States
ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station IVENR 0 the court succinctly enunciated
the principles of federalism doctrine: "Inmates of State penitentiaries should
realize that prison officials are vested with wide discretion in safeguard-
ing prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline reasonably main-
tained in State prisons is not under the supervisory direction of federal
courts."6  Often this doctrine is applied to cases that would involve the
possible disruption of a complex state administrative process, 5 perhaps
one such as the administration of state prisons. But the fact that nearly
all the recent cases expanding the rights of prisoners are cases in the fed-
eral courts dealing with state prisoners illustrates that this abstention doc-
trine has now become less important in prisoners' rights cases than ever
before.6
Perhaps the demise of both the "hands-off" and federal abstention doc-
trines was best stated by Judge Foley in the recent case of Wright v. IN-
Afann:70
No longer can prisons and their inmates be considered a dosed society
63Id. For other cases in accord with the court of appeals view, see Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d
105 (7th Cir. 1971); Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971), rcv'd, 40- U.S.
249 (1971).
64 40 U.S.LW. 4156,4157 (U.S. Jan. 13,1972).
65 Jacob, supra note 53, at 228 n.3.
65209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953). See also United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Rageo, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
67 209 F.2d at 107. For additional cases rejecting the abstention doctrine see Clutcherte v.
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nor. Jones v. Metz-
ger, No. 71-1865 (6th Cir. far. 14, 1972).
6 8 Alabama Public Service Commnn v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
69 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1964); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Carothers v. FolIette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Morris
v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.L 1970).
70 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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with every internal disciplinary judgment to be blissfully regarded as im-
mune from the limelight that all public agencies ordinarily are subject to.71
The following sections of this article discuss areas of law that have
been litigated by prisoners who asserted that in some way they had been
denied a right that they should possess. In nearly all of these areas the
courts have recognized to some extent that the inmate is not totally bereft
of rights. What follows is an outline of the current state of the law for
each particular area of prisoners' rights and an analysis of whether that
area has been properly dealt with by the courts. In addition, considera-
tion is given to the sufficiency of the reasons asserted to justify the with-
drawal of rights which an inmate would possess if he were outside the
prison walls. Because each area of law is treated separately, the student
of this area of law may not get a strong idea of the relative importance of
these asserted rights in any scheme of societal and constitutional values.
Needless to say, however, the extent to which any claim is upheld by the
judiciary it becomes a substantive right whose exercise is very important to
the claimant.
Finally, it is possible to make some general statements about the rela-
tive position of at least those prisoners' rights considered herein. Two
kinds of rights stand out as being of extreme importance. First, the ex-
ercise of all rights ultimately depends upon both the right to access to the
courts and the right to medical care: without access to the courts a prisoner
could not gain the recognition of any other right and would be totally sub-
ject to the whim of the prison administrators; without medical care the
enjoyment of other rights could prove meaningless. Second, rights closely
related to the exercise of first amendment freedoms do not seem to be sig-
nificantly less important than the rights to access and medical care for the
reason that these freedoms have always occupied a preferred position in
American values. Indeed, the interests protected by the first amendment
would seem to be present in prison just as in free society. Thus, prisoners'
first amendment rights encompass at least the belief and exercise of reli-
gion, as well as the rights to speak and hear that are present in the free
use of the mail. It is perhaps harder to differentiate other areas of inmate
rights in degrees of importance; nevertheless, the exercise of any of them
cannot be deemed unimportant, particularly since there are constitutional
commands present in nearly all. The right to be free from cruel and un-
usual punishment or the prohibition against racial discrimination are im-
portant values that have frequently been litigated in a prison context.
In addition, there has been a recent societal trend to expand procedural
due process rights for many groups, and no strong reasons exist to justify
the exclusion of prisoners from this trend. It would be very difficult to
71Id. at 132.
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designate any one of these areas as more important than another, for all
rights expressing constitutional values are important in themselves.
II. RELIGION
A. State of the Law
In the last decade there has probably been more litigation over the
religious rights of inmates and the development of a more coherent body
of law than in any other area of prisoner's rights.
Of all the problems affecting both prison population and prison admin-
istrators, the problem concerning religious exercise has enjoyed the most
litigation, publicity and growth and expansion as a legal concept in re-
cent years.72
The major part of this expansion was effected by litigation initated by
Black Muslims7" and has led to the general recognition of religious rights
of many kinds. The paucity of decisions within the past year suggests
that litigation over this right may be near its end.
1. Right to Equal Religious Treatment
Many of the early Muslim cases considered the now well-established
right of Muslims to be recognized as a religious group. In Sewell v.
Pegelow,74 Muslim prisoners alleged that because of their religious beliefs
they had been isolated, deprived of rights, discriminated against, and re-
fused the right to practice their beliefs. The court held that a cause of ac-
tion was stated, deciding that "the allegations generally of hardships and
deprivations inflicted soley because of petitioners' religious faith stated a
claim under the Constitution and required a hearing on the merits.""
The Seventh Circuit, in Cooper v. Pate," refused to recognize the Black
Muslims as a legitimate religious group and affirmed denial of any relief.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.77 Subsequently, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the district court properly enjoined prison officials from re-
fusing the plaintiff and other members of the Muslim sect the right to
communicate by mail, to visit with ministers of their faith, and to attend
Muslim religious services. 78 These and other cases have recognized the
Black Muslims as a religious group and have granted them various forms
7 2 Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarccratcd, 15 BUFF. L REv. 397,418 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
7 3 See, e.g., Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d
196 (4th Cir. 1961).
74 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
7 5 Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: On afuslir; Rites and Consltiztiona Rigbts, 62
COLUm. L Rnv. 1488, 1493 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
76 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963).
77 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
78 3S2 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
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of relief."0 Consequently, there is now no real issue concerning the legiti-
macy of Black Muslim religious rights in prison.
Many other cases, usually involving the Black Muslims, have estab-
lished the principle that prisoners are entitled to equal religious treatment.
Thus, in Cooper v. Pate, the court said:
Courts will closely scrutinize the reasonableness of any restriction im-
posed on a prisoner's activities in the exercise of his religion, and espe-
cially so where the adherents of one faith are more heavily restricted than
the adherents of another.80
In Long v. Parker,8' another case in which an order denying relief was va-
cated by the Supreme Court, Muslim plaintiffs alleged that they could not
use the prison chapel, could not possess the Koran, were not permitted
to wear religious medals, were not provided ministers, and were not given
Muslim dietary staples. The circuit court subsequently ordered a hearing
to determine whether the appellants were discriminated against and stated
that they were entitled to receive equal treatment and that members of
their faith have an absolute right to be free from discrimination because
of their beliefs:
[Where, however, the charge is made that the regulations .. .fall more
harshly on adherents of one faith ...the courts will scrutinize the rea-
sonableness of such regulations.82
Konigsberg v. Ciccone 3 illustrates that the right to equal treatment
does not belong to Muslims alone. In Konigsbeig the plaintiff alleged
religious discrimination because in order to attend religious services he,
a Jew, was required to have a special pass while Catholics and Protestants
were not. Consequently, he was unable to attend services from the segre-
gation unit he occupied because he could not get a pass, whereas inmates
of other faiths (which had a greater number of adherents) could leave
the segregation unit. The court held that Konigsberg was to be allowed
to attend religious services while he was in the segregation section, unless
the officer in charge indicated at that time that such attendance would pre-
sent a great security risk.n
79 See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp.
27 (E.D. Va. 1964); Shaw v. McGinnis, 14 N.Y.2d 864, 200 N.Y.2d 636, 251 N.Y.S.2d 971
(1964).
80 382 F.2d at 521.
81 351 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1965), vacated, 384 U.S. 32 (1966).
82 Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1968).
83285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968). See also Cruz v. Beto, 40 U.S.L.W. 3452 (5th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1972), where the Supreme Court vacated a judgment dismissing a complaint alleging
denial of equal religious treatment to a Buddhist inmate. The Covrt said, "If Cruz was a Bud-
dhist and if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the op.
portunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there was
palpably discrimination by the State against the Buddhist religion....
84For other equal treatment cases see Banks v. Havener, 234 F Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964);
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Case law indicates further that it is not permissible to punish an inmate
solely for his religious beliefs or for his attempts to practice those beliefs
in ways that do not gravely threaten disorder in the prison. In Pierce v.
LaVallee,5 the plaintiff was denied permission to purchase the Koran and
to contact his spiritual advisor. He alleged that he was subjected to soli-
tary confinement and lost "good time" because of this attempt to exercise
his belief. The court held that solitary confinement and loss of good time
imposed as a result of religious belief is not a matter of prison discipline
reviewable only in the state courts and that the allegation stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted. In a similar case, an inmate had been
subjected to four years solitary confinement for refusing to tell the warden
the names of the inmates for whom he spoke after he requested and was
denied the opportunity for Black Muslim worship. The court ordered
the prisoner released into the general population, saying:
A prisoner is not bereft of all his rights. Included among those retained
is an immunity from punishment for making a reasonable attempt to exer-
cise his religion, even a religion that to some of us may seem strangely
confused and irrational.86
These cases represent the general position of the courts but are by no
means the only cases standing for this principle.87
2. Right to a Minister, Religious Publications, and Religious Diet
Prisoners cannot be denied visits by ministers;68 moreover, it is dear
that adherents to the Muslim faith must be allowed visits by Muslim min-
isters." Although a court recently held that a Jewish prisoner was not
denied his religious freedom by the prison's failure to have a rabbi on the
prison premises, the prison had recently been negotiating to hire a rabbi
on a part-time basis because the small number of Jewish inmates pur-
portedly did not justify a full-time rabbi?0 Nevertheless, a number of
cases make it apparent that most courts will protect an inmate's right to
have contact with a minister,2 1 unless practical considerations render this
impossible or unless religious meetings proceed along nonreligious lines
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Suer.
Ct. DeL 1965).
85293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
SO Howard v. Smyth, 365 F2d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 1966).
ST See, e.g., Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965); &mwell v. Pegelow, 291
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
ss Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
89 Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.Y2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
90 Girtdemacher v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
91 Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 6S7 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aq'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir.
1971); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.).
Va. 1964).
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or become unruly.12 In Cooper v. Pate,93 for example, the Seventh Circuit
enjoined officials from refusing to allow Muslims to visit with ministers
of their faith and from prohibiting inmate attendance at services conducted
by a recognized Muslim minister. Recently, a federal district court ordered
that San Quentin make available the services of a Black Muslim minister
at the same hourly rates paid to Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant chaplains.,,
The right to receive and possess religious literature is an area of law
in which there has not been much litigation. Two early cases permitted
prison officials to deny inmates the right to receive such literature because
it was found not to be an unreasonable exercise of discretion on the ground
that the presence of such material might be inflammatory and cause dis-
ruption.Or Presumably, the authorities would have had no reason to bar
other, more conventional religious material. Recent cases indicate, however,
that the law is changing in this area. In WJalker v. Blackwell the court
held that inmates were entitled to receive the newspaper M~fuhammad
Speaks and that they could correspond directly with Elijah Muhammad for
the limited purpose of seeking spiritual advice. 7  Knuckles v,. Prasse"8 in-
dicated that the clear and present danger test applied to religious practices
in prison and that this test must apply to Muslim religious literature as well.
Nevertheless, the court held that since one interpretation of the publica-
tions was that they urged defiance, they could therefore be prohibited un-
der the clear and present danger test.
Although the question of an inmate's right to receive a special religious
diet has recently arisen in a number of Black Muslim cases, no clear prin-
ciple of law has emerged. In Childs v. Pegelow9 an action was brought
to enforce the superintendent's alleged promise to provide a pork-free
meal after sunset during Ramadan, but the court denied relief on the
ground that the claim did not rise to a constitutional level. The court in
92 Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a/t'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971).
93 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cit. 1967).
94 Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
95 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); In ro Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663,
361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
96411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
9 7Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968) held that an inmate was not
entitled to receive religious publications because the prison officials considered them inflamma-
tory and subversive of discipline and that such censorship was solely within the discretion of the
state officials. The Fourth Circuit recently changed its position in Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1971), where the court placed the burden on the state to justify the censorship
of Black Muslim publications and said that the exercise of religious freedom (here, receipt of
the publications) may be restricted only upon the showing of a compelling state interest. Re-
ferring to its decision in Abernathy, the court indicated that times bave changed and recognized
that prisons have had more experience with the effect of Muslim publications.
98 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
09 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Walker v. Blackwell'00 denied a similar request. On the other band, al-
though a request for a pork-free meal was denied in Abernathy v. Cun-
ningham, °10 it was denied only on the grounds that the inmate could al-
ready choose pork-free food and still receive a balanced diet. In Banks v.
Havener' 2 the court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to prepare an order per-
mitting plaintiffs to practice their religion and one form of relief which
had been sought was consideration of certain Muslim dietary practices.
Finally, Long v. Parker0 3 reversed the lower court's denial of relief and
remanded for a hearing to determine whether the appellants had suffered
discrimination by the refusal of prison officials to accommodate their spe-
cial Muslim dietary needs.
The opinion which appears to be the best reasoned of the dietary cases
involved a prayer for an order that the superintendent of the District of
Columbia jail respect Muslim inmates' dietary needs to the extent of pro-
viding at least one pork-free meal each day and coffee three times per
day.0'a It was not contended that the food policy was applied to plaintiffs
in a discriminatory way, but plaintiffs did show that perhaps two-thirds of
all meals were served with, contained, or were cooked with pork or pork
grease. In reversing dismissal of the claim, the court did not reach the
question of a violation of constitutional rights, but said that the lower
court must determine if impediments to the observance of the Muslim
dietary creed had a compelling justification and whether or not it was pos-
sible to pursue a food policy with a less strifling effect on the plaintiff's
exercise of religion.
To say that religious freedom may undergo modification in a prison en-
vironment is not to say that it can be suppressed or ignored without ade-
quate reason .. . [The administration has a responsibility] to reduce the
resulting impact upon those rights to the fullest extent consistent with the
justified objective.
... There is no finding as to whether any particular "considerations
." warrant the tax on conscience that the jail's food service policies re-
quire appellants to endure. Nor is there a finding as to whether that
program could not be administered in such a way as to lighten or elimi-
nate its burden on free religious exercise....
. . . [The menus were prepared] without respect for the fact that
some prisoners cannot dine on pork ...
. . . [If a prisoner's request is feasible], it represents the bare mini-
mum that jail authorities . . . are constitutionally required to do ... for
any group of inmates with religious restrictions on diet.105
Although religious belief is probably an absolute right even in prison,
100 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
101 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968).
102234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
10 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
104 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
105 1d. at 1000-01.
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the exercise of particular religious customs is not absolute, for these are
subject to reasonable regulation and can be lost if abused. "[I]n a prison
situation where the free exercise of religious beliefs could be a threat to
discipline, it is recognized that curbs are both necessary and constitutionally
proper."100 The courts have made this position clear. In Banks, the court
held that inmates must be allowed to practice their religion where there
was no clear and present danger of disturbance, but warned:
Lest there be no misunderstanding, the practice of this right (religious
freedom) in a penal institution is not absolute-it is subject to rules and
regulations necessary to the safety of the prisoners and the orderly func-
tioning of the institution.107
In Cooper, the court said that the authorities have the discretion to exclude
those whose past record demonstrates a high probability to misuse the op-
portunity for worship.110  But most often the requisite test for denial of
this first amendment right has been stated strictly, Thus, although the
court in Long v. Parker °0 held Muslim religious practice subject to rea-
sonable regulation, it also held that religious literature could be excluded
only if it constituted a clear and present danger; and Knuckles v. Prassel"0
applied this test to both the introduction of religious literature and the
practice of religion.
B. New Directions for the Law
When dealing in the first amendment area of religious practice in pris.
on, it should be remembered that the first amendment freedoms enjoy a
preferred position to all other rights."' The "freedom of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on . . . slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." ' .
The second basic principle that applies in dealing with religion and the
first amendment is that "the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature o,
things, the second cannot be." 113  Consequently, when considering what
rights under Coffin should be recognized as necessarily taken from an in-
mate, the test in the first amendment area must be stringent and the state
interests in restricting religious practices must be compelling, particularly
106 Comment, supra note 72, at 419.
107 Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27,31 (E.D. Va. 1964).
108 382 F.2d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1967). But see McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
109 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
110 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
113 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
112West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
113 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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if we accept the oft-stated precept that religion tends to assist rehabilita-
tion.1 14
One justification almost always offered in Muslim religious cases is that
the exercise of that religion tends to cause disruption and breach of
peace."' Sometimes the official rationale for withdrawing a right is that
it would be costly to provide it" or, as in the dietary cases, both costly
and administratively burdensome. But are any of these state interests suf-
ficiently strong to overcome the individual's right to practice his religion?
Although some discretion must necessarily be granted to prison officials,
for they are best qualified to testify to the chances of a practice causing
prison disorder and disruptions, nevertheless, there seems to be no reason
why they should not be required to furnish the court with objective reasons
for any such belief.
As a first principle, the freedom to exercise religion in prison cannot
be an absolute right, for it is not absolute even in the outside world. On
the other hand, the exact opposite should be true of the freedom to believe
in a particular religion, which would seem to be guaranteed by the equal
protection clause. Thus, even though it can be argued that belief in the
Muslim religion might lead to disruptive prison behavior,11 7 the state does
have available the less restrictive alternatives of punishing any actual dis-
ruptive behavior or of prohibiting any particular religious practice which
has frequently in the past lead to disorder. This is the least that seems
to be required by the strong commands of the equal protection clause and
the first amendment.
[I]n examining the justification for state infringement in the [area of]
First Amendment [freedom], the Supreme Court has recognized and
declared the principle that the means utilized by the state, as well as the
ends, must be legitimate. Even the most legitimate of legislative ends
cannot justify the endorcement of fundamental rights of individual citizens
if these ends may be accomplished by the use of less restrictive alternative
means which result in less invasion of these fundamental rights.' 18
Nevertheless, there must be some limit on the exercise of religious belief
in prison, for the state has a legitimate interest in avoiding inflammatory
situations.
The community of the free world has a built-in escape valve in the unre-
stricted [freedom of] movement of its members. As a result those who
find themselves approaching the brink of violent action can unrestrainedly
turn to innumerable other activities. Not so in a prison. Generally speak-
14 See generally State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Super. Ct. Del. 1965); Comment, =;pra
note 75, at 1500; cf. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MAALcMO X (1964).
15 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
16 Gittlemacher v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
117 Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967); Fulwcol v. Clemmer, 205 F. Supp. 3"0
(D.D.C. 1962).
118 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529,541 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ing the prison community is composed of irresponsible and emotionally im-
mature individuals .... Thus the essential problem of the prison com-
munity is that of maintaining an orderly institution which confines and
houses those who have a natural and acquired abhorrence of confinement
and a repulsiveness for the authority keeping them confined.110
So the really difficult questions are deciding how and to what degree
correctional officials can restrict the exercise of religious beliefs; and al-
though the courts will "closely scrutinize"12 any restriction on prison reli-
gious activity, there are ways that such scrutiny could be ineffective. Even
under the "dear and present danger" 121 formula, if courts merely accept
statements of prison officials that a practice constitutes a clear and present
danger to institutional order and safety, the test would be useless. Official
assertions of a danger to security or discipline have all too often been ac-
cepted without question by the courts in the past. Therefore, the courts
must make their own judgments as to the need for a restriction, presumably
basing their decisions on objective indicia offered by officials on the need
for curtailing religious activity. Otherwise, any "dear and present danger"
test will prove meaningless.
There seems to be no reason why the courts should not require such
indicia in first amendment cases. This would mean that "[b]efore a
prison official is allowed to lay his prohibitory hand on a religious group,
a finding reviewable by the courts that the group presents a 'clear and
present danger' to the orderly functioning of the prison should be re-
quired.1 122 The special nature of prison does not prevent use of this Su-
preme Court test, although it is quite probably true that in a prison case it
will be somewhat easier than in other contexts for a judge to conclude
that a clear and present danger exists. Moreover, use of this test in a
prison context would not be revolutionary, for a growing number of courts,
including three federal circuits, have already recognized its applicability. " '
Use of such a test has been discussed with approval by legal commenta-
tors.1
24
In instances where cost or administrative burden is asserted as the ex-
cur.e for not permitting a religious practice, such as in the minister or die-
tary cases, the first amendment impels the state to make an effort to permit
the religious practice. In such cases the balancing test applied in Barnett
119 State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 562 (Super. Ct. Del. 1965) (from a speech by Rev.
Donald Sheehy, O.P., LL.B., Catholic Chaplain of the D. C. Dept. of Corrections).
120 Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1967).
121 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S, 47
(1919).
122 Comment, supra note 75, at 1503.
123 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d
Cir. 1968); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmlpano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (ILD. Pa,
1969); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
124 Comment, supra note 75.
[Vol. 33
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
v. Rodgers125 offers a reasonable solution: in order to restrict a religious
practice the state must have a "compelling justificiation," and even then
the prison authorities must explore ways to achieve these interests by "less
stifling means" than those which totally restrict the religious practice.'-
The nonprison cases require no less;"2-and there appears to be no reason
for making a distinction. The strong interests of the first amendment
would be furthered, insuring conscientious efforts to provide inmates with
rights that those outside prison enjoy, while not placing an impossible bur-
den upon prison officials.
III. INmATE LEGAL PRACTICE AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS
A. Access to the Courts
In the past the courts have been least reluctant to interfere with prison
administration when called upon to protect access to the courts them-
selves.:2 This principle was strongly asserted by the Supreme Court in
Ex Parte Hull:'2"
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right
to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly
drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for that court
alone to determine.'30
Although most cases in this area involve efforts by inmates to challenge
their convictions, they also are responsible for a weakening of the noninter-
ference and "hands-off" doctrines. Moreover, such cases also opened the
door to vindication of other rights. 3 ' Since Ex parte Hull many cases
have made it dear that "there can be no interference with an inmate's ac-
cess to the courts;' 32 and that "regulations or restrictions that effectively
preclude an inmate from communicating with courts cannot be tolerated.""as
Thus, an inmate cannot be subjected to punishment for maintaining
a lawsuit or for anything he alleges in a petition to the courts. In Hymes
125 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
126 Id.
12 7 See Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950); West Va. State BJ. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
123Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoncrs: The Dcrcloping La', 110 U. PA. L REV. 935
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Note].
129 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
130 Id. at 549.
131 Supra note 128, at 987-88. See also Jacob, supra note 53, at 273.
13 2 Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Auarcness of the Rights of the Con.
vioted, 45 NEB. L REv. 669, 673 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Barkin]. Sce also Palmisiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.RJ. 1970); United States cx rcl. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp.
265 (N.D. In. 1943).
'33 United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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v. DicksonM  an inmate alleged that prison officials threatened him with
disciplinary action if he did not dismiss a pending action. Although the
complaint was mooted, the court said that if disciplinary action should re-
sult from statements taken from documents filed with the court, then the
prison officials will have unreasonably interfered with access and the court
will enjoin such action. Furthermore, in no way can complaints to the court
be chilled through the disciplinary process: "imposition of punishment or
threat of such punishment based upon a prisoner's statements or complaints
to the court about prison conditions chills the prioner's exercise of his
First Amendment right to voice legitimate complaints, and thus would
amount to a form of deterrent censorship."' 135 Additionally, under the
theory that access must be guaranteed, prison officials must not interfere
with the lawyer-dient relationship' 8 or hinder access to a lawyer. 137 One
court has enjoined inspection of incoming mail from attorneys for contra-
band unless done in the inmate's presence, because otherwise the threat
of the communication being read would exert a chilling effect on the in-
mate's sixth amendment right to counsel. 3 8
The principle of access to the courts has been expanded in recent years
to encompass the provision of legal assistance to inirates in order to make
the right of access more effective. Thus, in Johnson v. Avery" the Su-
preme Court held that as long as no adequate alternative was available
prison officials could not forbid a jailhouse lawyer from rendering legal
assistance to a fellow inmate in view of the fact that the latter needed
such assistance to gain access to the courts.140 Subsequently, a rule allow-
ing jailhouse lawyers to help only illiterates was struck down, for inmates
other than total illiterates also need assissance.14' The rationale for this
decision is that
the most important part of a legal assistance plan is not the law books or
library, or the availability of decisions, but the opportunity to consult with
134 232 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
135 Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See alto Meola v.
Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971), where the court held that censorship of the pris.
oner's petitions to the court violated the fifth amendment. In addition, the court found that
Meola's transfer to the Departmental Segregation Unit was motivated chiefly by a desire to punish
him for an attempted exercise of his right to access to the courts and held that this punishment
was unconstitutional.
1' Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp.
127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
'37 Sosre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp,
776 (D.R.I. 1970); Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 440, 227 N.B,2d 383, 386, 280
N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (1967), (Keating, J., dissenting); In rc Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d
417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
138Smith v. Robbins, 9 CR. L REP. 2295 (D. Me. June 18, 1971), aft'd, 10 Cp. L. REP.
2445 (1st Cir. Jan. 18, 1972).
139 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
'
4 0 See also Burnside v. Nebraska, 378 F.2d 915 (8th Cit. 1967); Jacob, supra note 53, at
267.
141Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
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an attorney or at least a person of good common sense and e.perience
who can, in a straightforward and complete manner, set forth the inmate's
claim in understandable fashion.142
States have recently begun to provide various forms of legal assistance
to inmates and courts are now beginning to rule on what, under Johnson
v. Avery, constitute adequate alternatives to the assistance provided by jail-
house lawyers. For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona denied an in-
mate access to legal materials where the state prison had a law school post-
conviction clinic and plaintiff had been represented by counsel in other
litigation in which he had engaged while a prisoner.113 By contrast, the
Fifth Circuit held that Texas did not provide an adequate alternative by
hiring only two lawyers and several law students to serve the needs of the
entire inmate population of over 12,000.144 Nevertheless, it seems well
established that reasonable restrictions can be placed on the activities of
jailhouse lawyers, 14 although arbitrary rules such as those forbidding one
inmate from having another's legal papers cannot be upheld. 4 '
B. Provision of Legal Materials
Recent litigation has developed the principle that equal protection and
effective access to the courts require the provision of legal books and papers
to inmates147 because, "The right to have legal materials may be an essen-
tial corollary of the broader right to have access to the courts, since access
is impeded if the prisoner lacks the opportunity to discover his rights." '" s
On the other hand, courts have denied prisoners the right to possess an ex-
tensive law library within a cell and have held that a state need not pro-
vide a law library for inmates at a state mental hospital.'" Nevertheless,
in an action seeking to enjoin prison regulations which severely limited the
times and places in which legal work could be done and severely restricted
the acquisition and possession of legal material, an Oregon district court
granted an injunction, agreeing with the inmate plaintiffs that the regula-
tions denied them access to the courts.5 Although the circuit court re-
142 United States ex tel. Stevenson v. Mancusi, 325 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (\V.D.N.Y. 1971).
In Afancusi the New York prison policy that prohibited an inmate from preparing legal papers
for any inmate who tested over the 5th grade level of literacy was held invalid because no alter-
native means of legal assistance was available.
143 Foggy v. Eyman, 10 CR. L REP. 2180 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Nov. 2, 1971).
144Novak v. Beto, 10 CL L. REP. 2241 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 1971).
145 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
1 4 6 In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, S7 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
147 United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Hat-
field v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
148 Jacob, supra note 53, at 263-64.
149 Robinson v. Birzgales, 311 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
130 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1969).
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versed because it was "self-evident" that the inmate:s had reasonable access
to the courts, it agreed with the basic reasoning of the lower court. " '
A more definitive answer to questions about the scope of the state's
duty to provide legal access and legal materials to indigent inmates was
provided by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Gihnore.1' 2  In that case the
defendant sued to enjoin enforcement of two prison rules: one established
a list of legal materials permitted in California prison libraries"' 3 (the pris-
on director had ordered all other law books in the inmate library de-
stroyed); the other rule barred retention of papers of another inmate by
jailhouse lawyers. The three-judge district court enjoined enforcement of
the first rule and interpreted the second so that it would pertain only to
storage of completed legal papers. The court noted that the regulation
seriously infringed the prisoner's right to reasonable access and indicated
that the case involved serious equal protection questions when affluent in-
mates could hire private counsel and purchase law books, while indigent
inmates had to seek out help of fellow inmates or use the prison library.
Thus, the district court concluded:
"Access to the courts," then, is a larger concept than that put forward by
the state. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner might
require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought
against him or grievances alleged by him.154
On direct appeal the Supreme Court dealt with the case rather simply, say-
ing, "Having heard the case on its merits, we find that this Court does
have jurisdiction . . and affirm the judgment of the District Court of the
Northern District of California.' 55
C. The Proper View of Access
Anyone who adheres to the Coffin v. Reichard'5 " theory of "retained
rights" certainly cannot quarrel with a legal development which guarantees
151 Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
152404 U.S. 15 (1971).
153 The rule did not provide for annotated state codes, U.S. Reports, Federal Reports, Cali-
fornia Reports, or the United States Code. There were only unannotated California codes and
copies of some local court rules in the library.
154 Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
155 Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). See also Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971),
where the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Younger v. Gilmore. The Cruz case involved a § 1983 action
brought by inmates of the Bexar County, Texas jail who claimed that authorities had denied
them access to law books needed to seek their judicial remedies. Plaintiffs sought an injunction
to restrain interference with reasonable access to hardbound lawbooks and other legal material.
Officials answered the complaint by stating that maintenance of prifon security necessitated re-
moving hardback books as part of an overall scheme to arrest the smuggling of contraband.
The district court summarily dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals refused to docket
the cases without prepayment of filing fees and security. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, stated:
"Whatever security measures may be needed respecting books, it ik. not conceivably plausible
to maintain that essential books can be totally banned." 404 U.S. at 59, 60.
156 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
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the right of access to the courts. Any retained rights would be meaning-
less without access to a court for their vindication; and with the enormous
number of successful cases involving inmate rights, it is certain that the
,asserted need for access to courts has a basis in fact. Since this is the right
on which all others turn, it must be guaranteed, by the courts, unless vindi-
cation of the right is to be left to the discretion of prison officials, "which
is tantamount to denying that such rights exist. ..." 7 Such a position
would be directly opposed to the Coffin view that rights are retained unless
the state can justify their withdrawal as a necessary concomitant of incar-
ceration.
The development of rules allowing law practice by jailhouse lawyers
also seems desirable, for it is undeniable that such rules increase access to
the courts by the indigent658 and further the purposes behind the writ of
habeas corpus."" Moreover, the reasons offered to justify curtailing law
-practice by jailhouse lawyers (but not to justify a reasonable regulation of
their activities), namely, that their activities result in (1) extortion of fees,
(2) fights, (3) development of inmate power structures, and (4) loss of
inmate morale were shown in White v. Blackwell"-" to have a questionable
basis in fact. Professor Jacob's account of that case illustrates that in fact
morale and harmony in the Atlanta prison was improved by the work of
jailhouse lawyers and that none of the prison officials could recall any oc-
casion in which extortion, fights or a breach of discipline was caused by
activities of jailhouse lawyers.""' Although this is but one study, no others
have appeared in which any of these undesirable practices have been docu-
mented.
Delineation of the better practice concerning the state's duty to provide
legal materials as part of the right to access is more troublesome. Yet it
seems dear that some minimum amount of material must be provided." -'
Access depends partially upon the prisoner's opportunity to discover his
rights and the remedies available to him; therefore, access to legal materials
would seem essential to adequate preparation and dear assertion of rights."
Consequently, the Legal Counsel to the Federal Bureau of Prisons con-
cluded:
Reasonable access to the courts logically includes permission for the in-
mate to acquire certain legal documents or books, and a reasonable oppor-
tunity for him to study and prepare materials. This is especially true
where the inmate is not represented by counsel.'( 4
157 Note, supra note 128, at 987.
15s Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
159 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
160 227 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Jacob, supra note 53, at 267.
161Id.
162 See Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
263 Note, supra note 58.
C4 Barkin, supra note 132, at 678-79.
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. In this area administrative interests such as cost of materials, space
available and generally smooth operation of the institution are considera-
tions weighing against granting every inmate request for legal materials.
Since these appear to be legitimate state interests, the test of what mate-
rials should be provided to inmates must be "one of balancing"10 5 the state
interests against the right of an inmate to have effective access to the
courts,166 a test which is perhaps implicit in both Price and Coffin. Al-
though reasonable discretion by officials might be appropriate as to the num-
ber and kinds of legal materials provided and the time available to use
them; nevertheless, courts should not fail to scrutinize denials to provide
legal materials, so that inmates can be assured of retaining effective access
to the courts. Consequently,
ft]here appears to be no justification for limiting the constitutional right
of prisoner access to the courts to the presentation of facts rather than
legal propositions. If the transmission of legal arguments is included,
how can the right be meaningful unless the courts assure prisoners rea-
sonable access to law books and legal materials?
Moreover, although it is not unlikely that many particular regulations
could be sustained as reasonable restrictions on the rights of prisoners,
it seems clear that prisoner access to the courts becomes meaningful only
when access to legal materials is protected and that this protection, in
turn, takes on substance only when the courts are willing to look into the
specifics of the situation .... 110
IV. MEDICAL CARE
Medical treatment and the right to receive it are obviously important
to an inmate.
Medical personnel, for example, are important. Inmates frequently are
in acute need of dental care and have a variety of phy,.ical problems which
long have been neglected. A physical examination is prerequisite to
classification decisions regarding an inmate, and it often reveals defects
requiring corrective treatment. Research has suggested that a reduction
of recidivism is associated not only with medical services for the standard
types of handicap but also in some cases with plastic surgery to correct
defects of appearance.O6s
A number of cases indicate that inmates do not always receive the
medical treatment they need. Moreover, in reply to a questionnaire, nearly
165 Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
106Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The Court observed that a state could provide
a reasonable alternative to jailhouse lawyers. If any court ever recognizes that inmate lawyers
do not provide adequate assistance to indigent inmates, then equal protection and a right to ef-
fective access might require the state to provide legal assistance to inmates, either in the form of
law students or perhaps public defenders. After all, indigents have access to legal aid before
incarceration. Therefore, what is implicit in their sentence which causes them to lose such access?
167 Note, supra note 128, at 993, 995.
168 TAsic FORcE REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 1.
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two-thirds of Iowa state prison inmates said they would prefer a private
physician at their own expense over the care they were then receiving.1
Nevertheless, most cases have sustained the denial of medical treatment.
Recently courts have begun to examine inmate allegations of the denial
of medical care' 70 more closely, so the law in this area is evolving. In the
past courts invoked the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine and granted
relief only for extremely serious deprivations of medical care, usually in a
damage suit after the injury had been suffered. Now, however, with the
greater willingness of the courts to review correctional judgments, there
is a move to expand this right to include all necessary and "reasonable"
medical treatment.
A. Early Law
In most early cases prisoners met with little success in alleging a denial
of necessary medical treatment. Relief usually was denied on the ground
that such a deprivation was not so gross as to amount to a cruel and un-
usual punishment. 17  In other instances relief was denied because the
court would not involve itself in the administration of prison discipline. -2
For example, in Redding v. Pate,73 an epileptic prisoner claimed that he
suffered intense headaches, that he had been accused of faking, and that
although he had been given some medication, he had not received any real
treatment. The court held that the complaint did not state a claim for
deprivation of "essential" medical care and relief was denied. In Culium
v. California Department of Corrections,'74 a prisoner brought a suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been assaulted and seriously injured
by a prison guard and was given inadequate medical attention for his in-
juries. Relief was denied because the plaintiff "failed to establish that
[his] treatment was so inadequate as to constitute a violation of his consti-
tutional rights. '75 The court noted, however, that in an exceptional cir-
cumstance a deprivation of essential medical care might constitute such a
violation.
On the other hand, courts were always willing to intervene in "excep-
169 Note, supra note 58, at 687. This seems especially surprising since most inmat s are indi-
gent.
170 Barkin, supra note 132, at 673.
'1 See Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1944); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th
Cir. 1944); Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Commonwealth ex rcd. Rogers
v. Cloudy, 170 Pa. Super. 639, 90 A.2d 382 (1952); State ex rM. Baldwin v. Warden of Mary-
land Penitentiary, 192 Md. 712, 63 A.2d 323 (1949); Jacobs v. Warden, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d
753 (1948).
172 Cullum v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
17a 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. ILl 1963).
174 267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
17 Id. at 525. For a similar denial of relief where an inmate requested dental care to ca'e
his teeth, see Schack v. Florida, 391 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968).
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tional circumstances." Thus, in McCollum v. Mayfield'7  an inmate, who
had become permanently paralyzed as a result of an injury sustained while
working in prison and who alleged that he was denied care which could
have prevented the paralysis, was held to have stated a cause for action.
Another case held that an inmate stated a claim for relief when he became
deaf from an alleged beating by prison guards and was subsequently denied
medical care.177  Other exceptional circumstances involved the denial of
medical care for an infected leg that was later amputated1 78 and the denial
of recommended surgery on an inmate's jaw.179
B. The Right to Reasonable Medical Treatment
Since 1965 a number of courts have begun to recognize a right to rea-
sonable medical treatment, perhaps adopting the view that "It]he obliga-
tion of a State to treat its convicts with decency and humanity is an abso-
lute one and a federal court will not overlook a breach of that, duty." '
Thus, a federal district court granted injunctive relief for two inmates who
were in poor physical condition, relieving them from the necessity of per-
forming heavy physical labor. In response to a contention that the inmates
had been refused needed medical treatment the court held that the prison
was required to furnish reasonable medical attention for injuries and dis-
abilities and to permit sick call at all reasonable times.181 A year later,
the Fourth Circuit granted relief to an inmate with a heart condition who
had been taken off a medically prescribed diet and assigned heavy labor,
stating that "[p~risoners are entitled to medical care .... Where there is
no provision for administrative review of claims of unreasonable depriva-
tions of such rights, those claims are certainly justiciable."'182 In the more
recent case of Tolbert v. Eyman,83 a diabetic prisoner claimed that he was
176 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
177 Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
178 Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957).
170 Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965).
180 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250,256 (3d Cir. 1949).
18 1 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Federal courts are just begin-
ning to delineate what the provision of "reasonable medical treatment" entails. The Third
Circuit in Nettles v. Rundle, 10 CR. L. REp. 2221 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 1971) held that no § 1983
cause of action was stated by an allegation that authorities were negligent in providing medical
treatment Instead, the court said this was merely an allegation of a tort under state law. Simi.
larly, the Tenth Circuit in Paniagua v. Moseley, 451 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1971) held that there
was no constitutional or § 1983 claim stated where there was only a difference of opinion as to
the proper treatment provided. The inmate sought mandamus to compel the warden to see that
he received surgery after the prison doctor treating the plaintiff decided that surgery was not called
for. In denying relief, the court noted particularly that this was not a case of a prisoner being
refused treatment. These cases might be taken to imply that although medical treatment of some
kind must be provided, federal courts will be reluctant to scrutinize the type of medical attention
furnished. But see Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970).
182 Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1966).
183 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970). For another very recent cae, see Martinez v. Mancusi,
443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970) in which a state prisoner suffering from infantile paralysis alleged
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denied the medicine that physicians told him he could have, even after his
wife attempted to send it. The court stated that "(t]hese allegations state
a perfectly viable claim .... [O]n the record before us, the potential for
strong factual dispute is apparent."1 4 Finally, at least one court has force-
fully spoken of an inmate's right to medical treatment in constitutional
terms. In Sawyer v. Sigler,"8 5 a physician recommended that one of the
plantiffs, who was possibly suffering from dangerous tumors, receive out-
side treatment, which was denied. The court ordered the warden to pro-
vide it and stated:
If the treatment or lack of treatment of a prisoner is such that it amounts
to indifference or intentional mistreatment, it violates the prisoner's consti-
tutional guarantees. When a state undertakes to imprison a person, thereby
depriving him largely of his ability to seek and find medical treatment,
it is incumbent upon the state to furnish at least a minimal amount of
medical care for whatever conditions plague the prisoner~sEG
Although courts are expanding the inmate's right to receive medical
care, none seems to have examined the considerations involved. First, it
seems that an inmate who receives reasonable medical treatment is a better
prospect for rehabilitation than one who does not. Second, since prison
rules normally do not permit an inmate to hire a private physician, impris-
onment deprives a prisoner of the opportunity that he would have to seek
treatment for himself if he were not incarcerated. But what correctional
interest is served if the state denies the inmate proper medical treatment?
The only legitimate reason for such a denial of necessary care is that it
would save the state the costs of providing treatment. But it has never
been asserted that reasonable care is prohibitively costly. Indeed, it has
been argued that treatment should be provided regardless of cost:
A state which deprives an individual of his freedom must assume an
obligation to provide those necessities consistent with decency and human-
ity. Providing adequate medical facilities and competent physicians is one
such obligation. . . . What is "adequate" medical care within the prison
seems to be the provision of opportunities and facilities similar to those
available on the outsideL87
This view seems proper, for no purpose is served by removing the burden
from the state to provide this treatment, for after all, imprisonment is in-
tended to deprive one of his liberty but not of his life.
that he had been deliberately removed prematurely from a hospital following an operation,
without a hospital discharge and in disregard of medical advice, and then prematurely returnei
to the prison population. The court held that a cause of action was stated under 42 U.S.C §
1983.
8 4 Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1970). Sce also United States Cx rcl. Hyde
v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970); Willis v. White, 310 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. La. 1970).
185 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970).
186 id.
187 Note, supra note 58, at 687.
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An issue not yet faced by the courts is whether or not "reasonable care"
encompasses preventive medical treatment such as checkups, vaccines, and
chest x-rays. Provision of such care would seem to be both wise practice
by officials and a part of reasonable medical care (for the same reasons
that the Task Force Report suggests remedial treatment is valuable) be.
cause inmates themselves cannot privately secure such care. Moreover, the
notion of incarceration contains nothing which suggests that when one be-
comes a prisoner he is no longer to benefit from modern medical practices,
many of which are preventative.
Even though there is no compelling interest to justify the denial of
medical care, it need not be provided whenever or in whatever manner de-
sired. Tally'88 called for reasonable care at all reasonable times, and this
seems to be the proper view in that it gives some discretion to administra-
tors. This approach enables officials to deal with chronic "complainers,"
i.e., inmates who wish only to avoid work and who consistently appear at
sickcall, and to regulate reasonably the time and place of any treatment.
Reasonable regulations are necessary because quite often "[v]ery minor in-
juries or illnesses can become of great concern to the individual who has
much time to brood about them."'180 Nevertheless, under the Coffin ap.
proach there is no reason why courts should not scrutinize prisoner com-
plaints in this area to assure that prisoners are not being unreasonably
denied medical treatment and to see whether administrators are abusing
their discretion.
V. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
This is another area of internal prison law which has changed rapidly
from one in which courts ,would seldom intervene to prohibit racial dis-
crimination to one in which administrators have a heavy burden to justify
any practices which fall unequally on the races. Such a change undoubt-
edly reflects the general movement throughout American law to prohibit
racial discrimination.
A. Past History
In Nichols v. McGee,190 a Folsom inmate alleged that he was subject
to systematic segregation, discrimination and degradation because of race
188 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). In the same case the court held
that requiring the plaintiff to take medicine in crushed form (for "security reasons"), which
caused nausea, was cruel and unusual punishment and a denial of medical treatment as requited
by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. (The medicine was readily available in forms which
would not cause nausea). Moreover, three inmates of the same institution had been declared
medically unfit to work and, therefore, had been denied good time credit by the warden. (There
was a statutory right to good time for working inmates.) The court held that this denial of good
time credit violated the fourteenth amendment because it exerted a chilling effect on the inmates'
constitutional rights to medical treatment.
189 Note, supra note 58, at 687.
190 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
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because he was forced to stand in all-Negro line and tally formations, live
in an all-Negro cellblock, and eat in an all-Negro dining area. The court
denied relief, asserting that there had been a failure to show that peti-
tioner's rights could not be preserved in the state courts but concluded that
"[e]ven if recourse had first been had to the courts of California, plaintiff's
proposed complaint could state no cause of action in this Court."""1 The
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from this order of the three-judge
court.'92 An earlier example of this "bands-off" attitude toward com-
plaints of racial discrimination was expressed in United States e.: rd. Morris
v. Radio Station WENR,' 93 a case in which the petitioner alleged that the
prison authorities discriminated by denying Negroes the opportunity to
audition or act as announcers for a radio program that had been estab-
lished. The court found it "dearly evident" that the complaint was with-
out merit and refused even to consider the truth of the allegations of dis-
crimination.' The development of these cases led a commentator in
1968 to remark that "[r~acial discrimination in the prisons enjoys a sur-
prising and tenuous immunity from judicial intervention."'10 Neverthe-
less, recently the law seems to have developed to such an extent that that
statement is no longer valid.
B. The New Development
A state can no longer maintain a system of segregated jails, prisons or
institutions for juvenile delinquents. Many cases now hold this, and no
cases have been found wherein the opposite has been sanctioned. In
Washington v. Lee,', a three-judge court held that state statutes requiring
segregation of races in Alabama prisons and jails violated the fourteenth
amendment. In Short v. Cavedo,9 7 the court ordered desegregation of all
local jails in Virginia. Board of Managers of Arkansas Training School v.
George95 and Montgomery v. Oakley Training SchooPl' led to the desegre-
gation of two separate juvenile training schools in both Arkansas and Mis-
sissippi respectively.200 Consequently, it appears that no state can constitu-
tionally maintain totally segregated correctional facilities.
19 169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (1959).
192 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
193209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953).
'9-ld. at 107. See also Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967), 'a:afcd, 392
U.S. (1968), where the Supreme Court dismissed as moot a court of appeals decision upholding
an administrative decision to allow inmates in cells to acquiesce or to reject a new assignee, ev n
though racial discrimination was the result.
9; Note, supra note 58, at 685.
196263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
197 6 CEt L REP. 2080 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 1969).
19S 377 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1967).
199 426 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1970).
200 For a similar holding concerning Alabama Reform Schcols, Eee Cram v. State Training
School for Girls, 413 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1969).
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The protection of the individual's right to be free from racial discrimi-
nation has undergone development beginning as early as 1963. In Dixon
v. Duncan,201 a court enjoined the threatened integration of a federal pris-
on dormitory because the proposed plan would have constituted discrimi-
nation on the basis of color. The plan would have given black inmates
a choice between integrated or all-black dormitories but would have forced
all the white inmates to integrate or suffer punishment.0 In Rivers v.
Royster,2 a an inmate complained that he was not permitted to receive a
Negro newspaper because he was a Negro, while white inmates were per-
mitted to receive white-oriented newspapers. The court held that the in-
mate had been denied equal protection since he was denied a right as a
Negro which was granted to white prisoners and said, "the prison superin-
tendent may not resort to acts of racial discrimin .tion in the administra-
tion of the prison."20 4  In addition, there are many recent cases in which
courts have considered themselves competent to scrutinize complaints of ra-
cial discrimination, even though the complaints were ultimately rejected as
not proven.20 5 One recent and very important case that found racial dis-
crimination is Jackson v. Godwin20 in which a black inmate charged that
prison officials denied him the right to receive Negro newspapers and mag-
azines while permitting white inmates to receive white newspapers and
magazines. The prison magazine selection committee had sought
"[Ujplifting," "entertaining and educational" magazines and (by regula-
tion] prohibited publications which would "incite and stimulate in an un-
healthy manner" because of "sexy or spicy" material or which contained
articles concerning racial unrest or violence which would aggravate racial
tensions and disciplinary problems in the prison.201
In reply to this contention the court said:
It is ... dear that the prison officials have not met the heavy burden of
justifying either the resulting racial discrimination or the resulting curtail-
ment of petitioner's First Amendment freedoms and denial of the
equal enjoyment of rights and privileges afforded other, and white, pris-
oners.
208
Later in the opinion the court observed:
Normally the discretion allowed the judgment of state officials is wide and
courts will not interfere absent a finding that the governmental action is
201218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963).
202 See also Bolden v. Pegelow, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964), where an injunction was is-
sued prohibiting racially segregated prison barber shops.
203 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
204 Id. at 594.
20, Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
206 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
207 Id. at 535.
208 Id.
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arbitrary or unreasonable, but where racial dassifications are involved, the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses... command a more stringent
standard.209
Consequently, with the demise of the "hands-off" and "abstention" doc-
trines in this area of law, inmates can expect to have their claims of racial
discrimination adjudicated more readily than before. Moreover, if such
claims are proven, it will take strong justifications by prison officials to sup-
port racial discrimination.
C. The Preferred View
It certainly is correct to require desegregation of penal systems and
facilities. Because of the strong constitutional command against racial dis-
crimination through state action, courts like the one in WVashington v.
Lee 10 could conceive of no consideration of prison security or discipline
which would sustain the constitutionality of state statutes which on their
face require complete and permanent segregation.2 11 No cases have ever
asserted any legitimate justification for institutional segregation, and all the
cases indicate that the reason for the segregation has been racial discrimi-
nation.
However, for individual complaints within a prison there could be situ-
ations in which a rule that resulted in racial discrimination pursuant to a
legitimate prison interest, such as prevention of a breach of security or to
avoid an inflammatory situation, would be constitutional. Thus, in a situ-
ation such as Dixon v. Duncan,212 where a dormitory was to be integrated
against the wishes of a minority, an explosive situation could have devel-
oped. Counterbalancing this, however, are the interests recognized by
Brown v. Board of Education,2 13 which apply in a prison context: "Insofar
as socio-psychological insights support Brown, they are clearly not limited
to the facts of that case, and the demands of the equal protection clause
have been extended beyond the area of education."2 14  In most circum-
stances the strong commands of Brown should override prison interests,
particularly since Cooper v. Aaron2 15 indicates that even the danger of vio-
lence and turmoil that might occasionally justify partial segregation must
'09Id. at 537. A recent case which can possibly be explained by the same rationale is
Owens v. Brierly, 10 CE. L REP. 2203 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 1971). The plaintiff was refused ,Fer-
mission to subscribe to Sepia, a "black" publication, which was not included among the prisan's
approved list of 125 publications (only two of the 125 were "black" publications). The court
of appeals held that the district court was wrong in summarily dismissing the claim as frivo!ous
and held that there must be a responsive pleading. The court stated that it did not even know
why the magazine was excluded.
210 263 F. Supp. 327 (LD. Ala. 1966).
211 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 196S).
212 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963).
213 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
214 Note, supra note 58, at 1003 n.103.
215 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
be limited to extreme cases. Therefore, the mere possibility of violence
should be insufficient to justify segregation. One commentator agrees in
large measure with this reasoning:
Although the problem of prison discipline does pose issues different from
those raised in the school situation, Brown v. Board of Education indi-
cates that discrimination on the basis of race is detrimental to the mental
health and to the quality of education of Negro school children, These
problems are relevant to penal theory oriented towards rehabilitation of
the convicted felon, who must be educated to accept his role in an inte-
grated society. The only countervailing consideration advanced for allow-
ing racial segregation of prisoners is that it will avoid the possibility of
violence between inmates. However, the segregation itself may 'be a cause
of violence within a prison, and even if it is not, the mere possibility of
violence has been held to be an insufficent reason to justify segregation in
other areas. Even though the issue of segregation is not within the first
amendment, ... it seems that such practices should be required to be jus-
tified by a showing of pressing public necessity.2 16
A very recent case is fully in accord with this view. In McClelland r.
Sigler.171 the district court ordered an end to the segregated housing of
state prison inmates, which had resulted in a preponderance of whites en-
joying more comfortable quarters than all blacks and some Indians and
Mexicans. The warden's argument that placing blacks in the more com-
fortable complex with whites would result in serious, racial strife was held
insufficient to overcome the denial of equal protection resulting from this
segregation. The court emphasized, "[Tjhe demands of equal protection
permeate the penal system, as well as other governmentally operated insti-
tutions."218
This analysis, then, moves beyond a strict Coffin test, which would re-
quire prison officials to show a rational and legitimate reason for any prac-
tice that segregates inmates, such as a substantial danger of disruption.
But if officials can demonstrate in fact that a riot is imminent, they have
probably offered a "compelling" reason. Thus, in some circumstances the
test for determining prisoners' rights to racial equality goes beyond Coffin
and becomes one of balancing the equal protection values of the Constitu-
tion against the state's legitimate interest in preventing prison violence.
VI. MAIL RIGHTS
A. Restrictions on Inmate Mail
Prison officials generally regard the opportunity to send and receive mail
as a privilege conditioned upon an inmate's authorization of censorship of
216Note, supra note 58, at 686-87.
217 327 F. Supp. 829 (D. Neb. 1971).
2181d. at 831.
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any letters. 12 In most cases inmate correspondence is limited to persons
on an inmate's approved correspondence list.
2 2 0
Your officer will supply you with a form on which you should list names
and addresses of all those with whom you intend to correspond ...
You may not thereafter correspond with anybody whose name is not on the
list, unless you have received prior permission .... If it becomes evident
at any time that correspondence does not meet approved standards names
may be deleted from the correspondence list .... In-coming and out-going
mail is censored in accordance with the authorization form which you have
signed. Therefore, you should not seal your letters.... 2 21
In addition to censorship, many other restrictions are placed upon corre-
spondence:
The frequency with which letters may be written varies greatly from
institution to institution. In some, the prisoner is permitted to write only
one letter per week; in others, two or three....
Penal institutions strictly control the contents of outgoing mail. Let-
ters generally must be written in the English language and must refer to
"family and personal matters only."222
Until very recently the courts uniformly upheld this regulation and
censorship of mail, usually without any discussion of the reasons for its
justification. For example, in McCloskey v. Afaryland-2  an inmate sought
a court order requiring officials to permit him to engage in extensive and
uncensored correspondence, but the court denied relief on the general
ground that prison officials must have a wide discretion because they are
responsible for the security of the institution.
While an inmate of such an institution should be allowed a reasonable
and proper correspondence with members of his immediate family and, at
times, with others, it is subject to censorship to be certain of its reason-
ableness and propriety. A broader correspondence is subject to substan-
tial limitations or to absolute prohibition. Control of the mail to and
from inmates is an essential adjunct of prison administration and the
maintenance of order within the prison.22,
Stated more bluntly, a suit by a prisoner seeking damages and the protec-
tion of his rights "to the security of an inviolate character of his letters
219 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 777 (DR.L 1970); Jacob, scpra note 53, at
237; HARVARD PRISON LEGAL AssIsTANcE PROJECT TRAINING MANUAL, at 67.
220 Jacob, supra note 53, at 233 nn.52 & 53.
2 2 1 f riATE RuLEs AND REGULATIONS, M.C.L, WALIOLE, ASSACHUSETTS, from th2
HARVARD PRISON LEGAL ASSISTANCE PRoJEcr TRAINING MANUAL, at 67-6S. For a survwi
of more such rules, see Jacob, supra note 53, at 237-40.
222 Jacob, svpra note 53, at 239. See also Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp 776 (DILL
1970), where Judge Pettine surveys the rules and restrictions that existed at the A.C., Cranstoa,
R.L
223 Within the past two years, a number of cases have begun to reject prison officials abco!ut
discretion in censorship.
22-4 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
225 Id. at 74.
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and packages while in transit in the United States Mails" 220 is properly
dismissed because "[i]t is well recognized that prison authorities have the
right of censorship of prisoners' mail. '227  Until last year one could say
that the law permitted censorship of the prisoner's mail, limitation of the
number and type of people with whom he could correspond, and restric-
tion of the types of correspondence in which he could engage.22
1. Mail to the Courts
Notwithstanding earlier law, the cases now grant inmates a nearly ab-
solute right to uncensored correspondence with the courts on legal matters
and are beginning to extend this concept to written communication with
public officials and attorneys.22' The Supreme Court considered mail to
the courts in Ex parte Hull, 30 a case in which prison officials pursuant to
an institutional rule refused to mail a writ which the inmate had prepared
for filing in the Supreme Court. The Court held that the prison regula-
tion was invalid, stating that officials may not abridge an inmate's right to
apply to a federal court.
Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court
is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for that
court alone to determine.23 1
This concept has been expanded beyond habeas corpus and now includes
access to the courts "for the presentation of alleged legal wrongs."-" "
At first, censorship of materials sent to the courts was merely frowned
upon. One case held that the receipt and delivery of mail to the courts
should be "[d]elayed no longer than the necessities of sorting require.
Further delay for other purposes, such as censorship, seems both inappro-
priate and unnecessary." '233 Recent cases, however, have made it clear that
mail to the courts may not be censored 34  The fct that prisoners may
exaggerate about prison conditions and make false allegations against pris-
226 Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483,484 (5th Cir. 1952).
227 Id. at 485. See also Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948); Sinclair v. Hender-
son, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
228See, e.g., Diehl v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1970) (the court did not even
closely scrutinize a refusal to allow an inmate to take a Bible correspondence course); Stroud v.
Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951) (a regulation was upheld which prevented business corre-
spondence),
229 See Section III of this article on Legal Access to the Courts beginning at note 128 supra,
230 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
231 Id. at 549.
2 32 Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965).
233 Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966).
2 34 See Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp.
878 (D. Mass. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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on officials cannot justify prison review and censorship of the contents of
an inmate's correspondence with the courts.23 5
2. Mail to Attorneys
Many cases stand for the proposition that although mail must be sent
to an inmate's attorney it nevertheless can be censored."as The rationale
of these cases seems to be that (1) refusal to mail such letters impedes
access to the courts which hinders an absolute right which the law secures
to a prisoner 37 and (2) general security and discipline considerations
justify censorship. For example, Bailleaux v. Holmes- ' held that letters
to attorneys could be censored but only if they were not unnecessarily
delayed. In Cox v. Crouse39 an inmate complained that letters to his attor-
ney were read and communicated to the Kansas Attorney General. On ap-
peal the circuit court upheld the trial judge's finding that "tis action...
was highly improper, but this court cannot infer that any prejudice arose to
petitioner from it."' 40
Nevertheless, the law seems to be slowly moving in the direction of
prohibiting censorship of communication with attorneys. This develop-
ment apparently began with the dissent of Judge Keating in the 4-3 deci-
sion of Brabson v. Wilkins241 in which he reasoned:
I believe that these limitations (restricting correspondence to an attor-
ney to matters regarding the legality of his detention and the nature of
treatment received, plus the right to censor all communications and excise
therefrom matters unrelated to permissible subject matter) as well as the
the authority given the Warden unnecessarily interfere with and endanger
this prisoner's right to communicate with his attorney....
Judges and courts are not the only persons or agencies capable of
granting relief to prisoners complaining about the illegality of their ...
detention. For this reason, I see no basis for distinguishing between
letters to courts, to the prisoner's attorney or to government officials.242
In Sostre v. Rockefeller '43 District Judge Motley adopted Judge Keating's
235 Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
236 Seealso Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (lst Cir. 1970) (letters to the A.C.LU. must b2
mailed); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th
Cir. 1965) (letters to attorneys concerning nonconfidential matters can h- censored); Sutton v.
Settle, 302 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1962) (mail to attorneys can be censored); accord, Burns v. Swen-
son, 300 F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D. Mo. 1969): "[R]estrictions will not be allowed to operate
to deny a prisoner access to the federal courts for the presentation of alleged legal wrongs."
=-
7 Burns v. Swenson, 300 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
2-18 177 F. Supp. 361, (D. Ore. 1959), rcv'd on othcr grounds, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
2-- 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1967).
240 Id. at 826.
241 19 N.Y.2d 433,227 N...2d 383,280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).
242 Id. at 438,227 N.E.2d at 385, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
243 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
19712]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
opinion as her own with respect to a complaint against the warden's cen-
sorship of mail to plaintiff's attorney. This ruling was upheld on appeal
and the circuit court also stated that when an inmate seeks to secure re-
dress of alleged abuses, the authorities cannot delete materials from cor-
respondence or withhold or refuse to mail a communication between him
and his attorney 2 4  In another recent case, Palmigiano v. Travisono,"4
District Judge Pettine also agreed with Judge Keating and found that "con-
tact with an attorney, and the right to consult privately, is vital to an in-
mate's access to the Courts."' " Consequently, he ordered that defendants
"shall not open or otherwise inspect the contents of any incoming or out.
going letters between inmates and ... [their attorneys]. 241  During the
past year a number of cases have adhered to this position,24" and one court
has even upheld the right to send letters concerning prison matters to the
news media.2"
B. Developing Concepts
Since mid-1970, three courts have strongly rejected the old law, held
various forms of mail censorship unconstitutional, and delineated the per-
missible limits of censorship. The landmark case was Palmigiano v. Tft
visono,2 1° an action brought by six inmates awaiting trial at Rhode Island's
Adult Correctional Institution at Cranston. The court did not limit its
temporary restraining order to the unconvicted detainees, 5 1 but ordered
an end to the reading and censorship of all incoming and outgoing mail,
including that of courts, government officials, and attorneys. The court
found that "total censorship serves no rational deterrent, rehabilitative or
prison security purposes .... "22 It stated that the indiscriminate "opening
and reading of all prisoner mail ...is a violation of the Fourth Amend.
244 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
245 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
246 Id. at 789.
247 Id. at 788-89.
248 Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971), af'd, 10 CR. L. REP. 2445 (1st
Cir. Jan. 18, 1972) a partial consent decree prohibited outgoing mail to attorneys, courts, or to
officials from being opened and permitted incoming mail from attorneys and courts to be opened
for contraband inspection, and then only in the inmate's presence; Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp,
392 (D. Mass. 1971), granted injunctive relief against censorship of correspondence with plain-
tiff's attorney, but permitted officials to examine the letters with a fluoroscope or metal detecting
device or to manipulate the envelopes manually; People v. Wainwright, 325 F. Supp. 402 (M.D.
Fla. 1971), ordered an end to censorship of prisoner's mail to and from local lawyers.
249 Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971). The court applied the clear and pres-
ent danger test and found no legitimate state interest supporting the denial of the inmate's first
amendment right to correspond with the news media. The court both noted that it was unrea-
sonable to argue that such correspondence would be a means of facili.ating escapes and said that
"the prisoner's right to speak is enhanced by the right of the publi: to hear."
250 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
251 The court granted plaintiffs' motion to convene a three-judge court and granted the tem-
porary restraining order on the mail censorship issues.
252 317 F. Supp. at 785.
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ment."2  Moreover, "[C]ensorship for such reason [to control criticism
of the institution) is an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amend-
ment rights ... including the right to petition for redress of grievances."25
In summary, Pahnigiano v. Travisono held:
(1) The officials shall not open or otherwise inspect incoming or out-
going letters to various public officials, courts, the inmates' attorneys, or
any licensed Rhode Island attorneys.
(2) All incoming letters (other than in 1 above) may be opened and
inspected for drugs, weapons, and contraband.
(3) Incoming letters may be read and censored for inflammatory writ-
ings and pornography except for letters from persons on the inmates' ap-
proved addressee list, which may be inspected as in 2 above, but not read.
(4) In censoring for pornography, officials must use the test of the
U.S. Supreme Court as enunciated in Roth v. U.S. '
(5) Reading of any outgoing mail is unnecessary and violates first
amendment rights of the parties involved unless done pursuant to a search
warrant. Without a search warrant, outgoing mail may not be opened,
read, or inspected.
The second case since mid-1970 to consider prisoners' mail rights was
Jones v. Wittenberg,5 6 in which the court ordered that for inmates await-
ing trial:
(1) There shall be no censorship of outgoing mail.
(2) There shall be no limitation on the persons to whom outgoing
mail may be directed.
(3) There shall be no censorship of incoming letters from the pris-
oner's attorney or from any judge or elected public official.
(4) Incoming parcels for letters may be inspected for contraband,
but letters may not be read.
(5) Proper arrangements shall be made to insure that prisoners may
freely obtain writing materials and postage.
(6) Indigent prisoners shall b. furnished at public expense writing
materials and ordinary postage for their personal use in dispatching a
maximum of five letters per week.
For prisoners under sentence, however, the court held that standards num-
bers (2) and (4) need not be applied and that reasonable limitations could
be placed on the number of letters sent.
Finally, JlcCray v. State57 found that censorship of outgoing mail
serves no proper state interest and permitted officials to censor incoming
mail only by reading it or searching for contraband. Moreover, when
253Id. at 791.
254 Id. at 788.
255 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
250 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
257 40 U.S.LW. 2307 (Cir. Ct. App. Md. Nov. 11, 1971).
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mail is to be censored, notice must be given and the inmate must be given
an opportunity to reply. 58
These decisions are certainly harbingers of the future and prison ad.
ministrators would be wise to modify censorship rules in order to save
themselves time and effort, for this area of law will undoubtedly generate
a great quantity of litigation in the near future. Fewer and fewer courts
can be expected to approve of unbridled censorship powers in the hands
of prison officials.
C. Considerations Against Restrictions
In the area of correspondence as in any other, "[t]he tension is evident;
a prisoner can be viewed as a citizen whose rights will be limited only to
the extent absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the status of incar-
ceration [Coffin], or he can be viewed as a 'quasi-slave' whose rights are
fully removed . . . [Price]."259 It is important to remember that written
communication is within the area of preferred first amendment freedoms
and thus a heavy burden must be placed on officials to justify restrictions
on written communication.
Both oral and written communications are included within the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. The free speech clause of
the First Amendment is broad enough to comprehend the right to cor-
respond with others. In addition, correspondence sent to public officials
to protect injustices or seek to redress alleged grievances is protected un-
der the clause of the First Amendment which guarantees the right to
petition for redress of grievances. 26
That the right to communicate by mail should not be withheld is further
justified by the fact that many of the values of freedom of expression are
present inside the prison just as in the general population: individual ful-
fillment, the need for information and the attainment of truth, and the
indication of attitudes and problems of the inmates.2 1  Since censorship
regulations involve issues of free speech, 2 2 it is incumbant upon the state
to mitigate interference with these first amendment freedoms, for it has
been said that:
[C]onstitutional safeguards are intended to protect the rights of all citi-
25 8 For another example of such a notice requirement, see Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 911
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court enjoined further censorship of inccming books and periodicalh
unless the inmate was given notice that the literature was being censored or withheld, an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and unless the censorship decision was rendered by a body that could be ex-
pected to act fairly.
258 Singer, Censorship of Prisoner's Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Singer].
26OPalmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
261 Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 407, 408 (1967) [herein.
after cited as Note].
262 Note, supra note 58, at 676.
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zens, including prisoners, especially against official conduct which is arbi-
trary, particularly in the area of... First Amendment freedoms.2cC0
Consequently, any arbitrary denial of the opportunity to send and receive
mail is unjustified.
This view is even stronger when it is considered that censorship or ab-
solute prohibition of outgoing letters violates the rights of the inmates'
correspondents. 64  Certainly, they have a right to hear the inmates' views
and criticisms whether they be a political expression of Black Panther
philosophy or criticism of the prison environment.
It should also be kept in mind that we are here concerned not only with
the First Amendment rights of plaintiffs but also with the rights of all
persons or institutions outside the prison who wish to correspond with the
plaintiffs.2 65
The Supreme Court has indicated beyond question that the first amendment
guarantees the right to receive and have access to ideas and information.c
[Tjhe right to receive publications is . .. a fundamental right. The dis-
semination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren market-
place of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.20 7
Moreover, in examining the justifications offered for censorship or denial
of the opportunity to send and receive mail, it should be remembered that
restrictions upon mail may have a deleterious affect on prisoner rehabili-
tation. Indeed, Chapter Five of the Task Force Report suggests that liber-
alization of policies governing visits and letters for inmates is also helpful
in order to move away for the outdated custodial institution because "the
emphasis on a myriad of rules, unexplained to inmates and often unrea-
soned in their operation, hardly educates a prisoner in the values of order
in society."'268 Consequently, arbitrary mail rules can hardly be justified
in the name of rehabilitation.
Compared with the prevalence of prison influences, letters from the
outside appear insignificant. The symbolic act of suppression by an ad-
ministrator is probably more harmful than their slight anti-rehabilitative
influence. It would seem that rehabilitation as an incarcerative purpose
cannot justify the restriction or suppression of material that is allegedly
detrimental to the inmate's rehabilitation.26 9
Another commentator takes this view more strongly:
26 3 Jackson v. Goiwin, 400 F.2d 529,533 (5th Cir. 1968).
264 Id.
265 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
266 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
267 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan joined by Justices Goldberg and Harlan).
2 68 TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 11, at 47.
269 Note, supra note 260, at 419.
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The harm censorship does . . cannot be gainsaid. Inmates lose contact
with the outside world and become wary of placing intimate thoughts or
criticism of the prison in letters. This artificial increase of alienation from
society is ill advised. Additionally, the limit on the number of letters a
prisoner may send or receive (because there are not sufficient personnel to
read unlimited mail) is dearly in violation of the concept that the prisoner
should be encouraged to remain in contact with his outer world acquaint-
ances and friends.270
Indeed, this author has found not one article or professional opinion where
it was asserted that any form of general censorship or mail restriction has
benefitted rehabilitation.
Although arguments are made that limits upon the persons to whom
letters may be sent benefit rehabilitation, it would seem that any such bene-
fit is marginal. If this is weighed against the first amendment rights of
the inmate to communicate and his correspondent to receive, prison officials
would have an almost insurmountable burden to justify any prohibitions
upon the persons with whom the inmate may correspond.
D. Justifications for Restrictions
Since both the commands of the first amendment and the interest in
rehabilitation argue against any mail restrictions, the reasons offered for
such limitations must be analyzed to determine what restrictions, if any, are
justified. In the past, at least eight different reasons have been given for
current prison mail practices.
(1) To assure compliance with prison rules.
(2) The administrative costs of censoring and processing many letters
would be high.
(3) Prisoners will enter into illegal outside activities or conspiracies.
(4) To prevent escape plans from being made.
(5) To protect sensibilities of persons outside and to prevent criticism
of the institution.
(6) To keep out pornography, which causes perverse sexual behavior.
(7) To prevent the introduction of contraband and weapons into the
prison.
(8) To screen out inflammatory writing that could incite the prison-
ers.
Of these reasons the first two dearly offer no justification for the re-
striction of mail rights because if there were no restrictions, there would be
no mail rules to comply with or censorship costs to justify a restriction on
the number of letters that a man could send or receive. Moreover, it seems
far-fetched to assert that mail restrictions prevent entry into illegal con-
spiracies, since nearly all prisons permit visitation without censorship and
any conspiratorial plans to be made could be made at that time. Except for
270 Singer, supra note 258, at 1054.
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the recent trial of the Harrisburg Seven, no example has been found in any
case or article where such planning was alleged to have occurred. There-
fore, the fact that "the general practice in prisons throughout the United
States is to allow free conversation between prisoners and their visitors"-'
seems to indicate that there is no real need to censor in order to prevent es-
cape plans from being made.272 The protection of public sensibilities is cer-
tainly not a serious justification because the prison officials "are not the pro-
tectors of the sensibilities of the public which can protect itself." ' 1
Criticism of prisons and their practices should undoubtedly be made more
public since the institutions are generally inadequate and "an attitude which
smothers information to the public about prisoners and prison life... serves
no rational social purpose supportive of prison objectives."1 4
The last three reasons all relate to excluding items from the institu-
tion, Whether or not any of them are accepted, there does seems to be no
legitimate need to censor or to restrict either the number of letters sent or
their addressees. Thus, the writer is in agreement with the court's ruling in
Pahnigiano v. Travisono that:
[T]he reading of any outgoing mail from the inmates is unnecessary and
in violation of the First Amendment rights of the parties involved unless
pursuant to a duly obtained search warrant, and in the absence of the same
no outgoing prisoner mail may be opened, read or inspected.ema
The availability of a search warrant should be enough to protect prison
discipline when the officials reasonably believe that some crime is being
committed. Reason number six, that pornography stimulates perverse sex-
ual behavior in the institutions, has been asserted only once and was prop-
erly rejected by the Palmigiano court as "a matter of conjecture and opin-
ion on the part of prison officials."7ro At no time have other writings or
official statements ever substantiated this bald assertion by Rhode Island
officials.
The two remaining reasons offer somewhat more persuasive considera-
tions for some mail regulations. First, the introduction of contraband,
weapons, and escape tools into the prisons could be a serious problem, par-
ticularly in a setting of close confinement where tempers can easily flair.
This is especially true in view of the drug problems currently facing many
prisons. Thus, the crux of legitimate concern with mail restrictions and
censorship is whether the officials will be able to maintain prison discipline
and security without these measures. However, this does not justify the
reading of an inmate's incoming mail; rather it would seem to permit only
271 Pabnigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
272 See also Singer, supra note 258, at 1054-55.
273 TASK FORCE RE'PORT, supra note 11, at 27.
274 Id. at 26.
275 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Accord, Singer, supra note 258, at 1054-55.
276 317 F. Supp. at 783.
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the inspection of packages for contraband and possible weapons." 7 Fi-
nally, the consideration that would require the reading of mail and periodi-
cals is difficult to assess because it is never easy to ascertain what writing
would be sufficiently "inflammatory" to cause disruption and justify sup-
pression of first amendment interests. The fact that the lower-ranking
prison officials who would administer such a test are likely to screen out
more than is necessary should not be overlooked. Moreover, there is little,
if any, proof that such writings have caused prison disruption in the past.
E. A Suggested Clear and Present Danger Test
Because of the substantial first amendment considerations it is apparent
that mail regulations should meet more than the reasonableness test of due
process? 78  Instead, some form of the clear and present danger test as
enunciated in Schenck v. United States279 and modified in Dennis v. United
States2s0 should be employed. Recently, an intelligent formulation of this
test in the prison context was put forth by Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Cir-
cult:
[In the area of first amendment freedoms] we have pointed out that strin-
gent standards are to be applied to governmental restrictions ... and rigid
scrutiny must be brought to bear on the justifications for encroachments
on such rights. The State must strongly show some substantial and con-
trolling interest which requires the subordination or limitation of these im-
portant constitutional rights, and which justifies their infringment . . .;
and in the absence of such compelling justification the state restrictions are
impermissible infringements of these fundamental and preferred rights.281
A recent comprehensive survey of inmate rights in Iowa agreed with this
position when it concluded:
Nevertheless, inquiring only whether a rational administrator could have
acted as he did to achieve a legitimate end fails to consider all relevant
factors, and may in fact unjustifiably deny an incarcerated individual his
first amendment rights. Therefore, it seems that a clear and present danger
analysis should be adopted by the courts to protect the prisoner's first
amendment freedoms.28
With the adoption of such a test there could be no justification for any
form of censorship or restriction of correspondents in order to prevent in-
277 It may be unrealistic, however, to enforce a rule which wculd allow prison .uards and
officials to open and inspect letters and packages for drugs and weapons, but would not permit
them to read the contents of the letters.
278 Note, supra note 58, at 675.
279 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
280341 U.S. 494 (1951).
281 Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) and Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where
this test is adopted.
282 Note, supra note 58, at 675.
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flammatory writings from entering the prison-at least until a great amount
of specific proof is offered to show that a real and imminent danger ex-
ists23
Thus, following the Coffin approach, "[jfudicial adoption of the view
that prisoners are people, that they will be free again, and that they retain
all those rights not necessarily stripped from them by the obvious needs of
the prison would result in startling changes in the lives of most inmates of
most penal institutions."" The right to communicate by mail would be
one of the most startling changes.
VII. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Obviously, prisoners retain the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the ban imposed by the eighth amendment. A conten-
tion that this right has been violated usually arises in daims by prisoners
who allege that disciplinary punishment has been excessive. Unfortunate-
ly, however, this eighth amendment prohibition is a vague one; and the
Supreme Court has done little to clarify its meaning in a way helpful to a
court considering a prison case. The Court has indicated that there are
two types of proscribed punishment under this amendment. The first type
involves treatment which is in itself inhumane: "It]he basic concept under-
lying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
While the state has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure
that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."2 5
Moreover, the amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" 1 The
other type of proscribed punishment is that which is disproportionate to
the offense for which it is imposed. In Weems v. United States'sT the
Court said that it is a "precept of justice that punishment for crime should
28s For a decision relevant to the censorship of incoming mail, see Scale v. Mason, 326 F.
Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971), where the court held that censorship or exclusion of reading ma-
terals would be justified only upon a finding of a clear and present danger to prison morale, mo-
rality, discipline or security. See also Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941, 944-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
an action to enjoin interference with the receipt of literature ordered through the mail, where
the court said:
We accept the premise that certain literature may pose such a dear and present danger
to the security of a prison, or to the rehabilitation of prisoners, that it should he cen-
sored.... Some censorship or prior restraint on inflammatory literature sent into pris-
ons is, therefore, necessary to prevent such literature from being used to caue disrup-
tion or violence within the prison.... On the other hand, while prsoners are obviously
not entitled to all of the rights of free citizens, we would be loath to find that an indi-
vidual's right to read such literature as he chooses, provided no substantial danger of
disruption is presented, is expressly or impliedly lost upon his incarceration, Coffin v.
Reichard. ... or that this right is any less significant than the right to be free from
arbitrary, capricions, or unwarranted punishment.
284 Singer, supra note 258, at 1055.
285 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,100 (1958).
2s0d. at 101.
287 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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be graduated and proportioned to offense."2 88 But how have courts ap-
plied these standards in a prison context?
A. Prison Conditions
In a small but rapidly growing number of cases, the courts have held
-that the conditions within a particular prison or an entire prison system
were so inhumane as to amount to cruel and unusual punishment of all
the inmates. The first of these cases followed soon after a habeas corpus
proceeding in which an Oregon court prohibited extradition of an escaped
Arkansas prisoner."' In an unreported opinion the court announced:
Arkansas conducts at her two penal institutions, Cummins and Tucker,
a system of barbarity, cruelty, torture, bestiality, corruption, terror, and
animal viciousness that reeks of Dachau and Auschwitz . . . .Arkansas
debases the base... [and] apparently is convinced that: fleshly sin of men
forfeits all rights of prisoners to any consideration and respect of humanity.
Arkansas prisons are institutions of terror, horror, and despicable evil.2 00
A possible forerunner to this case was Ex parte Pickens, a case in which a
district court in Alaska surveyed the terrible conditions in the Anchorage
city jail and stated, "Altogether, the place is not fit for human habitation
"291
In a class action attack on the Arkansas prison system brought in 1970,
a federal district court held that confinement in the then existing prison
system violated the eighth amendment. 2912  The court stated that if the
state were going to run a prison farm system, "it [was] going to have to be
a system that is countenanced by the Constitution .... "21) Rather than
granting individual relief, the court ordered prison authorities to submit
a plan for bringing the system within constitutional standards and speci-
fied certain minimum steps to be taken. Among the factors considered by
the court in reaching its decision were abuse by the trusty guards, stab-
bings, sexual assaults, the presence of alcohol and drugs, and the absence
of any rehabilitation service.294  This holding was affirmed on appeal.'"
Violations of eighth amendment were also found in two other actions
attacking jail conditions prior to 1971. In a suit seeking an injunction
288Id. at 367. See also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
289 Stephens v. Dixon, Habeas Corpus No. L-3112 (Baker County Cir. Ct. Ore., May 31,
1967) (unreported).
290 Id. See also 84 HARV. L. REv. 456 (1970); 6 C~iuM. L. BULL. § 2, at 250 (June 1970).
291 101 F. Supp. 285, 287 (D. Alas. 1951). However, the court denied relief because of the
total release approach to habeas corpus. See also In re Ellis, 76 Kan. 368, 91 P. 81 (1907).
2 92 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
293 309 F. Supp. at 385.
204 For a more general discussion of the Cummins prison farm, sea MuRToN & HYAMS,
AccOMPLIcES TO THE CRIME (1969).
295 Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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against inhumane treatment in the Cook County Jail,"' the judge noted
that the allegation if proven would constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Plaintiffs alleged that:
[T]he inmates were deprived of adequate food, sanitation, recreational
facilities, and medical attention, and were in constant fear of being beaten,
burnt, or sexually assaulted. The grand jury found that to preserve order
the warden relied upon inmate "barn bosses" who extorted money and
food from other prisoners and sold bedding and medicine ... and that
the guards ...did not interfere with the beatings and sexual attacks. -27
In Bryant v. Hendick, s the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas noted
that the evidence presented was very similar to that presented in Holt, in-
cluding overcrowding, filth, homosexual and other assaults, brutal guards,
and lack of any rehabilitation program. These conditions were held to be
cruel and unusual punishment; and the court ordered transfer of the two
plaintiffs and allowed 30 days for improvement of prison conditions.
The trend of these cases continued in 1971 and gained momentum as
various courts found that inmates were being subjected to cruel and un-
usual punishment in the Lucas County, Ohio, jail,m 9 the Little Rock, Ar-
kansas county jail,ro and the Maryland Defective Delinquent Institution
at Patuxent.' °1 The findings were based on many aspects of the institu-
tion, but in each case the court found conditions similar to those found
in Holt and Bryant: overcrowding, bad lighting, lack of personal hygiene
equipment, poor medical care, unsanitary conditions, censorship, restricted
visitation, poor food, and a lack of exercise, recreation, or rehabilitation
facilities. In addition, each of these courts ordered the adoption of a num-
ber of very specific practices and the improvement of many of the facilities,
which will require a great deal of expense and effort to achieve. These
cases significantly differ from the approach in Holt, where the court ordered
the officials of the prison system to submit a plan for improving the facil-
ities rather than doing the job itself.
Thus, all prisoners have the right to be free from inhumane conditions,
2 9
6 Inmates of Cook County Jail v. Tierney, No. 68 C. 504 (N.D. Ill., filed April 8, 19 8).
2976 C.i. L Bu.- § 2, at 237 n.5 (June 1970).
2987 C. L REP. 2463 (Phil. County C.P., Pa., Aug. 11, 1970).
299 Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), arid sub nor. Jones v. Metz-
get, No. 71-1865 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 1972). Se also Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707
(NiD. Ohio 1971) in which the court ordered the specific improvement of certain jail condi-
tions and operations.
ao0 Hamilton v. Love, 9 CE. L. REP'. 2293-94 (FD. Ark. 1971).
30 iMcCray v. State, 10 CaL L REP. 2132 0ontgomery County Cir. Ct. App., Md., Nov. 11,
1971). See also Nolan v. Smith, Nos. 6228, 6272 (D. Vt. June 29, 1971) where the court found
that inmates in protective segregation, who -were both neglected and housed in the worst section
of the ancient prison, were denied equal protection. The court noted, "Coupled with an almost
inhuman cold resulting from the combination of Vermont winters and insufficiently maintained
and inadequate facilities, this lack of opportunity for exercise and recreation creates more than a
semblance of a cruel and unusual punishment question:' But see Pingly v. Coiner, 10 Cr. L
REP. 2367 (W. Va. Sup. Ct., Jan. 25, 1972).
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,but the courts seem to be using a case by case approach in order to deter-
mine when a violation of the eighth amendment has occurred. Moreover,
it appears that many different evils must exist before a broad ruling will
be made; and one or two substandard conditions will undoubtedly be in-
sufficient for a court to castigate an entire prison or penal system. Never-
theless, such supervision by the courts is proper because the state has a
duty to treat its inmates humanely 02 and no legitimate state interest exists
for maintaining such conditions. Indeed, inhumane prisons breed an "in-
mate culture" and lead to recidivism.
In this kind of case the court can threaten to order the release of all
prisoners if conditions are not improved. Such action was threatened in
B yant, Hamilton, and Holt;30 3 and in the latter case this threat seems to
have been an effective means of bringing about improvement in the prison
system because "it places the burden upon the state to correct fundamental
deficiencies in the system, rather than merely providing post facto relief
for a single aggrieved prisoner." 04  Thus, in Arkansas additional funds
have been obtained to improve the system, new supervisory employees have
been added, the power of trusty guards has been reduced, weapons have
been confiscated, and there has been a decrease in physical assaults among
the inmates. 05 Ordering the release of prisoners would be a drastic remedy,
but official inaction would certainly be placed in the limelight by such an
order. One alternative to wholesale release would be to order the transfer
of the inmates to other facilities, but this would often be unworkable be-
cause of a lack of space. Another alternative to wholesale release would
be to hold in contempt those officials who fail to obey a court order to im-
prove conditions. With this remedy, however, there would not be as much
public reaction to the problem and consequently a greater chance of legis-
lative inaction. Furthermore, individual correctional officials will often lack
the resources necessary for the wholesale improvement of a prison or penal
system.
B. Individual Conditions and Punishments
It is well established that neither segregation, 3t 6 nor solitary confine-
ment, 07 nor being struck by a guard, 0 8 nor corporal punishment alone
202 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Johnson v. Dye, 173 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1959), rcv'd
per curiam, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
303 Eg., Hamilton v. Lowe, 9 CR. L Mip. 2293, 2295 (ED. Ark., June 2, 1971): "Thle
Court ... can and must require the release of persons held under (onditions which violate their
constitutional rights, at least where the correction of such condition is not brought about within
a reasonable time."
30484 HARv. L REv. 456, 462.
3051d. at 462-63 n.36.
306 Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967).
307Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1964); Beishir v. Swenson, 331 F. Supp.
1227 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
308 Cullum v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.0°  Although whipping with a
cat-o-nine tails was long ago held not to violate the constitution,310 more
recently whipping by the strap in Arkansas was held to contravene the
eighth amendment."' Such individual practices as chaining to cell bars,"
requiring heavy physical labDr from inmates in poor physical condition,
a bread and water diet intended to physically debilitate the prisoner, 1'" and
the use of the telephone or teeter board to discipline prisoners" have all
been held unconstitutional. In fact, one court has held that denying regu-
lar outdoor exercise necessary for health violated the eighth amendment
rights of a death row inmate housed under a statute requiring solitary con-
finement.3 16
Although each of these cases represents one specific practice, many other
cases are litigated in which no one condition or punishment is cruel and
unusual, but in which all conditions together are examined. The kind of
decision to be made in these cases is necessarily quite subjective and there
is no coherent body of law in this area. Instead, courts seem to follow the
principle that when conditions violate their own concept of the "evolving
standards of decency,"31- they will intervene. Naturally, this produces
inconsistent results. Perhaps, one can perceive what the law regards as
impermissible punishment by examining the kinds of claims that have been
rejected as opposed to those that have been accepted. For example, in
United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy3t" close confinement in a hot and
stuffy room and the denial of recreation and other privileges was permis-
sible. Another court found that no federal right was violated when a pris-
oner alleged that he received vicious beatings, solitary confinement for two
months without clothes or blankets, no food for five days, and a denial of
privileges 19  In Landman v. Peyton320 the court held that it was not cruel
and unusual punishment when an inmate was not permitted to work while
in maximum security, received only two meals per day, had access neither
to the library nor to educational classes, had no radio or television, was al-
lowed only one bath per week, and was occasionally tear gassed. More.
309 Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
310 In re Candido, 31 Hawaii 982 (1931).
311 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
312 In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889). Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(ED. Va. 1971), held that chaining or handcuffing an inmate while in his cell violated the eighth
amendment.
3 13 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
314 Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
315 Jackson v. Bishop, 263 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
316 Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
317 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
318112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
319 United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956).
'20 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
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over, while he had been placed in solitary the inmate had no visits, was
given bread and water for every two out of three clays, and had no under-
wear, combs, toothbrushes, or razors, and very little bedding. In Siegel v.
Ragan821 an inmate was forced to sleep on a cement floor in solitary, was
chained by his wrist, fed bread and water for six out of every seven days,
and spent 92 days subject to this treatment with only one bath. Such
treatment was held to be constitutionally permissible.0 22
Cases holding an individual punishment to be cruel and unusual have
very little to distinguish them from cases not granting relief, although oc-
casionally the facts of a particular situation may seem more outrageous.
Significantly, however, most of the cases granting relief on these grounds
are fairly recent, indicating the greater willingness of the courts to inter-
Ivene to protect inmate rights. For example, confinement in segregation
for only two and one half days was recently held to be unconstitutional
when two inmates were confined to a six by twelve foot cell without win-
dows, lights or exercise; were placed on reduced diets, subjected to a strip
frisk; were given no clothes, bedding, sheets, or toilet articles; had only
one commode and one steel bed without a mattress; and had only one
blanket and towel-the blanket had to be used as a mop for the toilet
overflow which had splashed onto the floorY23  Two other fairly similar
cases illustrate perhaps the worst conditions litigated; and of the two per-
haps Jordan v. Fitzharris 24 is the worse.
In Jordan an inmate was confined in a six by eight concrete strip cell
that was without light for 12 days. Moreover, the cell lacked heat and
was unclean, the toilet was flushed only twice each day from the outside,
and plaintiff had no means to clean himself even after vomiting. No sani-
tary precautions were taken with his food. He was naked for the first eight
days of confinement and thereafter was given only a rough pair of overalls.
For sleep, he had only a stiff canvas mat smaller than himself placed on the
cold floor. The court noted that this punishment "shocked its con-
science." 3' 5 In another recent case, dealing with conditions nearly as ter-
32188 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Ill. 1949). See also Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.
1970) (inmate was confined to maximum security for 3 years); Ford v. Dd. of Managers,
407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969) (no running water or wash bowl; bread and water diet except one
regular meal every third day).322 See also Novak v. Beto, 10 CR. L REP. 2241 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 1971), where the court
held over a strong dissent that the solitary confinement of an inmate for 9 weeks was not cruel
and unusual punishment even though his head was shaved, he was provided only scanty clothing,
his cell was totally deprived of light, he was not permitted to exercise, and was placed on a
starvation diet of one meal every three days except for black bread and water. This decision
seems somewhat inconsistent with many recent cases such as Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971), where the court held that the eighth amendment was violated by a bread
and water diet.
3 23 Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
324 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966). The other case is Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp.
786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, No. 71-1203 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1972).
325 For other cases where confinement was held to be a cruel and unusual punishment, see
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rible, including no heat in a cold northern New York winter, the court
said:
The subhuman conditions alleged ... to exist in the "strip cell" at Dan-
nemora could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the
sanity of the prisoner. The Eighth Amendment forbids treatment so foul,
so inhuman and so violative of basic concepts of decency.a -
However, the recent Second Circuit decision in Sostre v. McGinnis'
indicates that fine lines will be drawn in making such a determination, for
it overruled a lower court finding of cruel and unusual punishment for a
13 month solitary confinement even though the warden's motives for such
confinement were deemed to be improper. Sostre had been isolated with-
out another person in his cell block for nine of these 13 months, had no
recreation or work, had lost all group privileges, and was allowed only
one hour's exercise per day which he refused because it was conditioned
upon a strip frisk. District Judge Motley found that the isolation imposed
upon Sostre was "dangerous to the maintenance of sanity"3" and "could
only serve to destroy completely the spirit and undermine the sanity of the
prisoner." -  But the circuit court deferred to the practices of the prison
officials and did not even uphold the district court's limit of 15 days upon
any future solitary confinement. The circuit court noted the factors it con-
sidered important:
In arriving at this conclusion, we have considered Sostre's diet, the
availability in his cell of at least rudimentary implements of personal
hygiene, the opportunity for exercise and for participation in group ther-
apy, the provision of at least some general reading matter . . . and the
constant possibility of communication with other segregated prisoners. =
Certainly a sentence of imprisonment does not imply disciplinary pun-
ishment under poor conditions. Indeed, Coffin suggests that an inmate
cannot be subjected to barbaric disciplinary punishment; but, unfortunate-
ly, this view does not assist one in deciding what practices are impermis-
sible. Instead, an examination of disciplinary punishment which balances
the interests of the inmate against those of the prison is a better approach
to determining what disciplinary practices are impermissible a3l As a first
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Howard v. State, 237 P. 203 (Sup. Ct. Ariz. 1925).
26 Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967). The inmate was stripped naked,
had no heat, the filthy cell was barren, there were no toilet articles and he was forced to sleep
on a cold concrete floor. This occurred on two occasions, one lasting 33 days, the other lasting
21.
= 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).3 28 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. at 863.
Mi9d. at 871.
330 442 F.2d at 193-94.
31 For some of the most recent cases in which courts have held that individuals were sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment, sce Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971)
(untried arrestees); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (R.D. Va. 1971); Sinclair v. Hender-
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principle, both case law and enlightened practice sul.gest that any corporal
punishment should be unconstitutional. Both Talley v, Stephens, 2 and
Jackson v. Bishop333 suggest this. Moreover, use of corporal punishment
is "brutal and medieval and [does] no real good."' -3 4 James V. Bennett,
former director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and Fred Wilkerson,
Director of Missouri Corrections, recently testified that use of corporal
punishment for discipline is useless and should be abolished because it
serves no legitimate correctional purpose. 83
The institutional interest in disciplinary punishment is to deter and to
punish disruptive behavior of inmates and to separate "incorrigibles" from
the rest of the prisoners to preserve safety and order.3 0 Certainly the
separation of an unruly inmate to solitary confinement with humane condi-
tions is sufficient to preserve safety and order. For this purpose the depriva-
tion of light and heat, small and unclean cells, no toilet articles, reduced
diet, and improper sanitation are all unnecessary. Consequently, one must
ask if such deprivations are justified by retribution or for any deterrant
value. No proof has ever been put forth to show that such practices have
any deterrent effect on improper behavior and in fact it is often the same
offenders who are repeatedly confined to these solitary cells. Certainly
other, less loathsome methods of punishment exist: reduced privileges, no
work, loss of good time, or confinement to one's cell. Therefore, it would
seem that no purpose is furthered by inadequate cell conditions in solitary
confinement except vengeance, which 'today has lost much of its acceptance
as a legitimate correctional goal. 33 7 Thus, in cases considering such base
confinement conditions, courts should hold that the lack of these basics con-
stitutes an impermissible cruel and unusual punishment.
Certainly precedent for such action exists. Even if there are not a large
number of specific deprivations in segregation, nothing should prevent a
court from declaring unconstitutional any punishment that deprives an in-
mate of rehabilitative opportunities such as work, education, or mail and
visitation rights, so long as no legitimate correctional interest is served by
such deprivations. This is especially true when many of the punishments
involve action detrimental to rehabilitation and even sanity. In order to
justify harsh disciplinary punishment, administrators should be able to show
that another punishment with less onerous conditions would not achieve
son, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Lollis v. N.Y. State Dept. of Social Services, 322 F.
Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (juvenile).
332 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
333 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
334Id. at 813.
3351d. at 813-814.
336 Such reasons have been offered in Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); and Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
337 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11.
[Vol. 33
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
their purposes and that the harsher punishment does not interfere with
rehabilitation programs. Without at least this justification, punishment
would seem to violate "evolving standards of decency."338
C. Disporportionate Punishments
A few courts have held that long periods spent in segregated confine-
ment constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the punishment
imposed was disproportionate to the offense committed. Influential in these
decisions, no doubt, were the conditions under which such confinement
was spent. For example, Judge Motley in Sostre held that even if the rea-
son given by the warden for Sostre's thirteen month segregation-that he
possessed another inmate's legal papers in violation of a rule-had been
believed, this fact still would have amounted to a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.a The punishment in Wright v. AirMann40 was held to be gross-
ly disproportionate when co-plaintiff Mosher was confined at length for
refusal to sign a safety sheet because he felt that it would waive his right
to damages for any possible injury. In Jordan v. Fitzlharris01 the court
recognized that "a punishment may be cruel and unusual if greatly dis-
proportionate to the offense for which it is imposed" 2 and indicated that
the American Correctional Association's standards, which restrict punitive
segregation to 15 days, would meet minimum standards required by the
eighth amendment. In the leading case of Fulwood v. Clemnierc ' 3 a Black
Muslim was segregated for more than two years for preaching in a manner
tending to breach the peace while on a recreation field. In concluding that
this was an unreasonable punishment for the offense,31- the court said:
Despite the power of prison authorities to make proper rules and regu-
lations for the government of prisoners, and to maintain discipline in the
prison population, a prisoner may not be unreasonably punished for the
infraction of a rule. A punishment out of proportion to the violation
may bring it within the bar against unreasonable punishments^45
Although it is difficult to formulate a proper objective rule for this
phase of cruel and unusual punishment, it is recognized that solitary con-
finement can be very degrading and demoralizing"O and can erode the
833STropv. Dulles, 356U.S. 86,101 (1958).
3 This holding was reversed on appeal. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
340 387 .2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
341 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
421 d. at 679.
343 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
3 4 For other cases applying similar tests, see Roberts v. Pegelow, 313, F.2d 548 (4th Cr.
1963); United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Sce sho
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
345 206 F. Supp. at 379.
34 6 See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 387
F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
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foundations of any useful life. At least this is the view of commentators
such as Goffman and Sykes. 34  Similarly, Judge Motley found that
[Plunitive segregation under the conditions to which plaintiff [Sostre]
was subjected at Green Haven (was] physically harsh, destructive of morale,
dehumanizing in the sense that it [was] needlessly degrading, and dan-
gerous to the maintenance of sanity when continued for more than a short
period of time which should certainly not exceed 15 days.348
Given the availability of effective alternatives, what legitimate state inter-
ests are served when a punishment, particularly under these conditions, is
so long that it is degrading and destroys mental health? The best rule is
to apply an objective standard that would not permit abuse, such as that
suggested by the American Correctional Association's Manual on Correc-
tional Standards:
Ordinarily no inmate should be retained in punitive segregation on restric-
tive diet more than fifteen days, and normally a shorter period is sufficient.
Those who fail to make an adjustment under such conditions can often be
treated more effectively in special administrative segregation facilities. The
punitive segregation section should not be utilized for indefinite or perma-
nent segregation. 340
In addition, the A.L.I. Model Penal Code allows prison disciplinary segre-
gation, but "not to exceed thirty days." 3a °  Currently many states do not
have such time limits on punitive segregation either by statute or prison
rule.",' Thus, it seems that no valid prison interest is served by confine-
ment for longer than some period of approximately fifteen to thirty days.
Reasonable alternatives to such punishment exist; and if not used, the in-
mate may suffer serious mental harm. Therefore, lengthy solitary confine-
ment, just as corporal punishment, should constitute a violation of the
eighth amendment.
VIII. PROCEDURAL Dun PROCuSS
The extent to which procedural due process guarantees apply to pris-
oners is not dear. Many different prison regulations and state statutes
govern procedural rights for inmates in any proceeding that could result in
punishments such as loss of good time, transfer to solitary confinement, or
other serious deprivations of liberty.az In addition, courts are beginning
to inquire into prison procedures that result in substantial additional dep-
47 See . DONNELLEY, J. GOLDSTEIN, & P. ScHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 428-32 (1962).
348 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34 9 AMERICAN CoRRECrIoNAL AssOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS
at 683.
350 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 304.7(3) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).
351 Jacob, supra note 53, at 241.
3-2 For examples of such regulations and statutes, see Jacob, supra note 53, at 242; Note,
supra note 58, at 696-97.
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rivations, although few specific procedural requirements have gained con-
sensus acceptance. Nevertheless, it is relatively dear that:
A prisoner carries with him to prison his right to procedural due pro-
cess which applies to charges for which he may receive punitive segrega-
tion or any other punishment for which earned good time credit may he
revoked or the opportunity to earn good time credit is denied.203
A. The Traditional Approach
Siegel v. Ragena4 exemplies the traditional approach of the courts to
an inmate's claim of a denial of due process in a prison disciplinary hear-
ing. The inmate had been placed in solitary confinement with a loss of
privileges by order of the warden without any hearing and was kept there
for 92 days. The reviewing court invoked the "hands-off" doctrine and
refused even to scrutinize the prisoner's contentions because the "matters
alleged in the amended complaint are strictly matters of internal adminis-
tration and discipline." 3 The Eight Circuit's treatment of Burns v. Swen-
sonr35 illustrates that the traditional theory still has vitality. In Burns an
inmate had been summarily segregated and confined in maximum security
for three years, and six months passed before there was a review or hear-
ing concerning his summary punishment. The court indicated that it was
"loath" to interfere with state prisons, that no formal hearing was required,
and that emergencies require the unilateral segregation of prisoners. Never-
theless, the view that prisoners retain procedural due process rights, a view
consistent with the Coffin position, is beginning to win more acceptance
in a number of prison situations.
B. The Determination of a Disciplinary Violation
Disciplinary hearings in prison often result in substantially additional
burdens to inmates. Prisoners can, inter alia, lose good-time, be sent to
isolation, forfeit various privileges, be locked in their own cells, be re-as-
signed to a more restrictive environment, and have offenses noted in their
permanent file that is reviewed by the parole board. In keeping with the
353 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The United Stares Su-
preme Court has strongly implied that due process must be accorded a prisoner before he can he
disciplined. In Haines v. Kerner, 40 U.S.LW. 4156 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1972), an inmate brought a
§ 1983 action, complaining that he had been placed in solitary as a disciplinary measure. He
alleged that he had suffered physical injuries because of the nature of that confinement and that
there had been a denial of due process leading to his confinement. The district court dismissed
for failure to state a claim, but the Supreme Court reversed, stating that "allegations such as
those asserted by petitioner... are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evi-
dence." Nevertheless, Haines does not give any hint as to what such due process requirements
might be.
' 4 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
3.5 Id. at 999.
356 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
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recent rejection of the "hands-off" and abstention doctrine, a number of
courts have found violations of due process rights in this kind of hearing.
A number of these decisions have indicated only that procedural due
process standards were not met in the disciplinary hearing that resulted in
punishment. For example, in United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate", an
inmate lost an opportunity for parole hearing because he had been trans-
ferred to a lower prison classification for a "conviction" that the inmate
claimed resulted from an unreliable determination of the facts. Guards
had found an orange powder in his cell that Campl:ell identified as Tang,
a powdered drink that he was permitted to have. The guards, however,
claimed that it was something else but refused to have it analyzed. The
court indicated that a claim for relief was stated because the "relevant
facts.., must not be so capriciously or unreliably determined .... "I An-
other case that relied on due process, without enunciating any standards,
was Talley v. Stephensr 9 in which an Arkansas prisoner had been sum-
marily whipped for alleged rule violations. The court enjoined use of the
strap until its use was "surrounded" by appropriate due process safeguards.
Nevertheless, as in Campbell, the court made no attempt to define what
these safeguards might be.
A different approach, illustrated by Nolan v. Scafati,60 Sostre v. Me
Ginnis,"6' Meola v. Fitzpatrick,8 " and Kritsky v. McGinnis,a6  is one in
which the court does not order adherence to certain procedures but does
suggest what might be minimally required.8U In Nolan, Judge Wyzanski
indicated that
Without deciding the matter, we may ... assume that the due process
clause requires . . . that before a prison authority imposes upon a prisoner
a serious penalty . .. the authority must (1) advise tie prisoner of the
charge of misconduct, (2) inform the prisoner of the nature of the evi-
dence against him, (3) afford the prisoner an opportunity to be heard in
his own defense, and (4) reach its determination upon the basis of sub-
stantial evidence.365
357401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968).
358 Id. at 57.
359 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
300 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and remanded, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
361442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
302 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971).
263 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161
(D.N.J. 1971).
364 This same judgment is also made by courts which implicitly reject the "hands-off" doc-
trine and decide that a certain disciplinary procedure is adequate. What they are actually doing
is making a determination that the procedure employed meets minimal due process requirements.
See, e.g., Beishir v. Swenson, 331 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
365 306 F. Supp. at 3. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint
and remanded for a hearing to determine, inter alia, whether the punishment was great enough
to require procedural safeguards, and further stated that "some assurances of elemental fairness
are essential when substantial interests are at stake." 430 F.2d 548, 530 (1st Cir. 1970).
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In Kritsky, an inmate had been sent to segregation and had lost 18 months
good-time. The court agreed with Judge Wyzanski in Nolan and indicated
that his four requisites would probably be sufficient to meet due process
standards. Similarly, the court in Afeola stated that the punishments of
segregation and loss of good time were sufficiently great to require pro-
cedural safeguards, "at least the elementary ones of notice of the charges
against him and an opportunity to reply to them." ' The Meola court,
'however, failed to indicate if these would always be sufficient safeguards.
In Sostre v. McGinnis the court, in reversing a lower court's more stringent
holdings, stated:
If substantial deprivations are to be visited upon a prisoner, it is wise
that such action should be least be premised on facts rationally determined
.... In most cases it would probably be difficult to find an inquiry mini-
mally fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted with the ac-
cusation, informed of the evidence against him ...and afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to explain his actions. 367
Unfortunately, in none of these cases did the courts indicate whether or
not the suggested procedures would always be sufficient or whether more
or less might be required in specific situations.2
C. Recent Developments
A number of cases, including three New York Federal District Court
decisions, began to expand and to delineate more precisely the notion of
due process in prison, although the New York decisions may have been
overruled by Sostre v. McGinnis."9  These New York decisions, Sostre v.
Rockefeller,370 Fright v. AlcMann,371 and Carothers v. Follette, "' required
the New York prison authorities to adopt new prison rules that included
due process standards which the court had ordered. The procedures that
were ordered to be adopted initially by Judge Motley in Sostre indicated
that in a disciplinary hearing involving a possibly serious penalty an in-
mate was entitled to: (1) written notice of charges, (2) recorded hearing
before a disinterested official, (3) the chance to cross-examine adverse
witnesses and to call witnesses in his own behalf, (4) the right to retain
counsel or counsel substitute, and (5) a written decision. The judges in
366 322 F. Supp. at 886.
367 442 F.2d at 198.
3 68 For additional procedural due process cases in a prison setting not mentionel here, but
recently decided, see Potter v. McCall, 443 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331
F. Supp. 1123 (R-D. La. 1971); Lollis v. N.Y. Dept. Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Owens, 9 Ca. L REP. 2415 (Cook County Cir. Cr. App. IlL, July 9,
1971).
369 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
370 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
371321 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
372 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Wntght and Carothers recognized the lack of standards in the correctional
system's disciplinary process but found it unnecessary to act because of
Judge Motley's decision.
Prior to the New York cases, the first court decision that required com-
prehensive due process procedures in a prison hearing was a consent order
entered in a class action challenging institutional classification and disci-
plinary systems at the Adult Correctional Institution at Cranston, Rhode
Island.73 This order was more comprehensive than any other given prior
to that date. It dealt not only with procedural requirements at a disciplin-
ary hearing but also with the entire procedural framework of the classifica-
tion of inmates within the prison. The order established four categories of
classification, required notice and the right to be assisted by a classification
counsellor at any hearing, and further required that any decision be made
only upon substantial evidence. Moreover, before disciplinary punishment
could be imposed, a number of other procedures were required. These
included a hearing for any offense, investigation and review by a superior
officer, a record, no summary discipline without approval by a superior of-
ficer, a right to present information, and special emergency provisions.
In 1971 four additional due process decisions continued the trend to-
ward precisely defining the perimeters of the fourteenth amendment in a
prison context. These decisions all required the adoption of the procedural
protections that Judge Motley had ordered adopted in Sostre and in some
cases the court added additional requirements. Bundy v. Cannon,.7 4 a deci-
sion involving a Maryland state prison, approved new Department of Cor-
rections rules and noted that a protracted term in solitary or a forfeiture
of good-time would be sufficient to trigger these due process requirements.
Cluchette v. Procuniet73 ordered a halt to disciplinary proceedings at San
Quentin until the state instituted proceedings that would provide the basics
of due process. The court ruled that due process required not only a deci-
sion by a fact finder uninvolved with the incident but also a written find-
ing of the facts and notice of a right to appeal the decision whenever the
hearing could result in a serious 1oss.370 In addition, when the inmate is
charged with a violation which may be punishable by state authorities, the
373 Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
374 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). Although the state Department of Corrections issued
this new set of rules, an interim opinion filed by the court on March 2, 1971 had required most
of the procedural protections that ultimately appeared in the rules.
375 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The court also ordered that notice must include a
brief statement of the facts upon which the charge is based and contain the name and number
of the rule violated. Moreover, seven days notice of the hearing was the minimal acceptable
limit. Representation was to be provided by "counsel or counsel substitute."
3761d. at 785. The court defined what, at a minimum, "grievous loss" meant in terms of
possible punishment: (a) indefinite segregation or indefinite confinerent to the adjustment cen-
ter;, (b) referral to the Adult Authority for possible sentence increase; (c) a fine or forfeiture of
earnings; (d) isolation for 10 days or more; (e) referral to the District Attorney for possible crim-
inal proscution.
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prisoner must have counsel at any hearing and not merely a substitute for
counsel. Similarly, in Landman v. RoysteeW? the court applied due process
requirements to disciplinary hearings in a Virginia state prison whenever
solitary confinement, transfer to maximum security, lost of good-time, or
10 day padlock confinement was a possible penalty. For lesser punish-
ments, the court ordered less stringent procedures. Moreover, the inmate
could select a "lay advisor" for representation, presumably a staff member
or another inmate. Finally, a Montgomery County Circuit Court in Mary-
land became the first state court to make a sweeping due process order
when it required the same protections, including counsel, if the violation
could be prosecuted as a crime. 3-8
D. The Developing Law
The requirements of procedural due process in prison disciplinary hear-
ings are just beginning to be precisely delineated. Nevertheless, courts
have reached differing results; and it is impossible to predict the specific
procedural safeguards that any particular prison administration might be
required to apply in a disciplinary hearing that could result in the imposi-
tion of substantial punishment. Due process undoubtedly requires some
minimal degree of procedural protection when serious punishment is pos-
sible. Therefore, a consensus is slowly developing to require that notice
of the charges against an inmate be given, that a formal hearing be held,
and that the inmate has the right to be heard in his own defense. Addi-
tionally, substantial authority has indicated that the safeguards of (1) rep-
resentation by counsel or counsel substitute, (2) the right to present favor-
able witnesses and cross-examine unfavorable witnesses, and (3) an impar-
tial body to render any decision are necessary; although it cannot now be
said that such safeguards represent a consensus requirement.
It seems clear that inmates should retain procedural due process rights
to some extent. Both the Coffin reasoning, which would require a strong
justification to deny such procedural protections, and the principles enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in recent due process cases, which seem to
apply to prisons as well as to other institutions, lead to this conclusion.
Such cases as In re Gault, 0 Alempa v. Rhay,3sI Specht v. Patterson,,"'
37333 F. Supp. 621 (ED. Va. 1971). The court also required that reasonable notice be
given before the hearing and that any decision made must be based upon evidence presented at
the hearing. Although the court did not require an appeal, it did say that any appeal decision
must be restricted to this evidence.
378 McCray v. State, 10 CR. L REP. 2132 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct. App., Md., Nov.
11, 1971). This case involved procedures at the Maryland Institution for Defective Delinquents
at Patuxent.
379 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
380 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
381386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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and Goldberg v. Kelly,382 have led to the development of the principle that
whenever there is a proceeding which can result in added restraints upon
one's liberty, the proceeding must be surrounded by due process safe-
guards 3 Sa Similarly, the Second Circuit has recently stated:
Escalera and Goldberg are persuasive recent authority that states may
not avoid the rigors of due process by labelling an action which has serious
and onerous consequences as a withdrawal of a "privilege" rather than
a "right." Mempa warns us that procedural formality may be required in
the operation of the criminalization and incarceraticn process beyond the
determination of guilt at trial. Thus, we do not doubt that Sostre was
entitled to "due process of law" before he was puni3hed for an infraction
of prison rules.384
Because disciplinary hearings can impose severe punishments, this must be
the correct view for them. Indeed, loss of good time "has some of the
characteristics of extending a sentence"385 and long terms of solitary can af.
fect a man's sanity.388
In addition, modern correctional theory regards due process at such
hearings as essential. 37 The Task Force Report emphasizes the need for
fair procedures and their relationship to the desired "collaborative regime."
The necessity of procedural safeguards should not be viewed as antitheti-
cal to the treatment concerns of corrections. The existence of procedures
both fair in fact and perceived to be fair by offenders is surely consonant
with the "collaborative regime" emphasized as desirable by modern cor-
rections, in which staff and offenders are not cast as opponents but are
united in a common effort aimed at rehabilitation. In a prison no less
than in society as a whole, respect for, and cooperation with authority re-
quires the guaranty of fairness.388
Moreover, the existence of fair and adequate procedures would lend to the
federal courts a greater assurance that discretion is properly exercised; and
when review becomes necessary, the factual findings of an administrative
panel would be entitled to greater weight than any sort of system without
procedural safeguards.89 If procedural due process rights are retained by
inmates, the balancing test implicit in Coffin suggests that "the difficult
question, as always, is what process was due? ' ' 011
A valid first principle in the due process area would seem to be that
"the greater the impact on the conditions of present or prospective liberty,
382 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
383 Jacob, supra note 53, at 245.
384 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 1971).
385 Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970).
386 See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
387 Barkin, supra note 132.
88 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 13.
389 Prisoner's Rights Under Sec. 1983, 6 CRIM. L BULL. § 2 (June, 1970).
390 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 1971).
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or the physical and psychic integrity of the prisoner, the greater (or more
plausible) the claim to substantive and procedural safeguards."' Never-
theless, in any disciplinary hearing, in order to further the ends of fairness
and to assure valid factual determinations, there would seem to be required,
at a minimum, rules that are announced in advance that can be complied
with,"' notice of any infraction, a hearing, and a chance for the inmate
to explain himself.39 3  Most of the recent due process decisions have re-
quired as much.3 94 Indeed, these protections are now present in hearings
in many correctional systems today. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons,39 Rhode Island,396 and Iowa397 prisons abide by such rules and
seem to function at least as well in terms of discipline as do other systems.
Moreover, no correctional administrators in these systems have indicated
that any of these procedures are overly burdensome or that they provide
insunnountable difficulties to prison administration.
However, when a hearing involves a more serious offense, like a long-
term isolation or loss of substantial amounts of good-time, then perhaps
more should be required. Nevertheless, for each requirement added to a
hearing, a greater tension between due process norms and administrative
efficiency is created because procedural demands require greater time and
effort than do quick ex parte determinations. Consequently, how do tie
requirements of substantial evidence, the right to call witnesses, cross-exam-
ination, representation, and an impartial hearing body fit into the proceed-
ings? Some would take the view that nearly all are desirable procedures.
The truth has a poor chance of emerging in any adjudicative proceeding
in which the witness against the alleged offender is not present, the proof
consists of a written hearsay statement of the prosecuting witness, and the
defendant is not given an opportunity to cross-examine or present his wit-
nesses.398
In this area of due process the Tack Force Report distinguishes betveen
less important decisions in which officials should not be overly restricted,
where it would be enough to allow an opportunity to hear the basis of a
proposed decision and to present relevant opposing facts and arguments,
and more important determinations involving good time, which call for
391 F. COHEN, IMUcATIONs FOR MAANPOWER AND TRAINIG: THE LEGAL CHALLLNGn
TO CORREMcoN: 78 (1969) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
392 Id. See also Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Owens, 9 CL
L REP. 2415 (Cook County Cir. Ct. App., Ill., July 9, 1971).
3 93 COHEN, supra note 391, at 13.
39 4 See BuMs v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.L 1970).
3 9 5 Hirschkop and Mfillemann, The Unconstitutiorality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L REV.
795, 830-34 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hirschkop and Millemann].
29 6 See Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.L 1970).
397 Note, supra note 58, at 695.
398 Jacob, supra note 53, at 247.
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notice, an opportunity to present evidence, confrontation and cross-exami-
nation of opposing witnesses, and the right to representation by counsel. a"
Indeed, disciplinary hearings in the Federal Bureau of Prisons seem to func-
tion smoothly, even though at any hearing serious enough to involve loss
of good-time the inmate can be represented by a staff member, present
evidence, call witnesses, confront his accuser, and cross-examine adverse
witnesses."'0 This success would seem to indicate that the practical obsta-
cles to such procedures are not immense and that such safeguards are cer-
tainly feasible. Moreover, the Coffin view of retained rights supported
by the teachings of Gault, Specht, Alempa, and Goldberg would suggest
that as many procedural rights must be retained as is feasible.
E. Specific Procedural Requirements
It should be emphasized at this point that any fear of disruption or dis-
order by prison officials must never justify the lack of a hearing. Rules
might allow summary isolation of some kind,401 but the holding of a hear-
ing within a few days after any possible inflammatory situation is a rea-
sonable alternative to counter official arguments that effective and efficient
penal work requires summary punishment without a hearing.
1. Representation by Counsel
Although representation by counsel may be a de3irable practice in terms
of ascertaining facts and assuring fair procedures, it seems practically un-
feasible.
Perhaps the most troublesome element of due process in a prison set-
ting would be a guarantee that inmates are entitled to trained counsel, be-
cause the practical problems involved in supplying counsel in all disciplin-
ary proceedings would be great in terms of legal manpower, time, and
financial requirements.402
Nevertheless, in prisons sponsoring law student projects, experience might
reveal that representation by these students can be a legitimate alternative.
A different practice now used in many systems, including the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, is representation by a staff member. The widespread
nature of tis practice suggests that it is not difficult to achieve and that it
has some desirable aspects. However, a recent study indicated that most
inmates did not feel benefitted by such representation and suggested that
this feeling might be due to the staff member's lack of time to prepare
adequately, to conflicts over the nature of the staff member's role in the
3 99 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 86.
4 0 0 Hirschkop and Millemann, supra note 395, at 834. Nearly the same is true in the \W'ash-
ington prison system. See Jacob, supra note 53, at 243.
401 As did the court order in Morris v. Travisono, supra note 394.
402 Jacob, supra note 53, at 246-47.
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proceeding, and to the fact that most hearings involve only the testimony
of the complaining officer as evidence0 3 Although these reasons suggest
that such representation has limited usefulness, it may very well provide
valuable assistance to many illiterate inmates and consequently should not
be rejected unless a feasible alternative is presented.
2. Substantial Evidence Requirement
A recent Harvard study has indicated that the substantial evidence re-
quirement is probably useless under current hearing conditions because
most adjudications involve only testimony by guards and inmates; and the
judging officials, who are co-workers of the charging officer, never disbe-
lieve the charging officer.04 This observation seems to have been substan-
tiated by a deposition of Warden Follette in the Sostre litigation when he
stated that, even in situations where he was not the complainant, he or
whoever was judging would invariably believe a guard's report, since "the
officers are not liars."'4 05 Consequently, until a disinterested person or board
makes the determination at these hearings, this specific due process stan-
dard would seem to be a useless requirement. Indeed, the fact that hear-
ings usually consist only of a guard's report or testimony in accusation and
the inmate's confession or denial of guilt means that in most circumstances
the hearing may not be a fact-finding process at all but something more akin
to a sentencing proceeding.
3. Right to an Outside Adjudicator
Courts have just begun to look at the requirement of a disinterested
adjudicator. Judge Motley required a recorded hearing before a disinter-
ested official in Sostre v. Rockefellet °w and Judge Mansfield suggested in
Carothers v. Follette that for any serious charge due process required "a
relatively objective tribunal. '4 0 7  However, neither of these orders contem-
plated the services of a person from outside the prison, which was required
by the interim opinion of Judge Thomsen in Bundy v. Cannon.i = 0
The presence of such an outsider would give meaning to the substantial
403 These are some of the tentative conclusions contained in a draft repott of a study of the
classification and disciplinary procedures used in the Adult Correctional Institution, Cranston, Il.,
which was undertaken by the Harvard Criminal Justice Center.
404 Id.
4 0 5 Brief for Appellee at 25, Sostre v. McGinnis, 422 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
406 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
407 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
408 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. id. 1971). This requirement was originally ordered by the court
in its interim opinion of March 2, 1971. The subsequent opinion did not order the adoption
of such an adjudication but noted that the correctional officials had just adopted new rules '.hich
set up "reasonable guidelines.- These rules call for hearing examiners from the Department of
Corrections, who are not members of the staff of any institution, to he employed in determinations
involving serious rule violations.
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evidence requirement by avoiding institutional loyalties and conflict of in-
terest in the decision making body. Moreover, his role would undoubt-
edly imbue the inmates with a greater confidence in the fairness of the sys-
tem to which they are exposed. Certainly, the suggestion that hearings now
involve little more than institutional officials' acceptance of testimony by
guards indicates that the presence of an outside adjudicator would benefit
the search for truth in the disciplinary process. 'Thus, even though the
disciplinary process might not really be one of fact-finding, the impartial
adjudicator could still insure that proper investigation is undertaken in
those cases where he has even a small doubt of the accuracy of the accusa-
tion.
On the other hand, employment of an outsider or perhaps a small num-
ber of people who alternately assumed this role would be costly; and it
would undoubtedly cause inconveniences and delays in coordination of
activities. In addition, if it became apparent to guards that their accusa-
tions were no longer accepted pro forma, it would be easy for them to
evade the formal disciplinary process in their day-to-day contact with and
control over the inmates and to apply their own sanctions. Such prac-
tices could include hazing, arbitrary denial of privileges, beatings, or pos-
sibly enticement of prisoners into rule violations. Unfortunately, one study
shows that even under an elaborate procedural system this is a very real
possibility.40 9
Unless an impartial adjudicator is present in a disciplinary hearing,
one might question the suitability of due process procedures designed to
insure fair fact-finding because with the present composition of disciplin-
ary boards, many members of which have at least a professional rapport
with the accusing witnesses, one could hardly expect an impartial determi-
nation. Indeed, perhaps even with an impartial per.son present, more than
mere acceptance of the guard's or administrator's accusation, cannot be ex-
pected, regardless of what procedures are followed.
4. The Right to Call Witnesses; Confrontation; Cross-Examination
The reason offered against giving an inmate the opportunity to call
witnesses is that such a right could be abused by a powerful inmate who
could get any number of inmates to testify on his behalf.410 Nevertheless,
prison officials who were part of the hearing board could reasonably limit
the number of inmates who could appear; and because of their knowledge
of the institution, the accused, and the witnesses, these same administrators
could, if necessary, discount testimony.411 Moreover, any reasons for so do-
ing could be communicated to any outside members of the board. There-
409 Supra note 403.
410 Jacob, supra note 53, at 247-48.
411 Id.
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fore, the reasons offered do not seem sufficient to deny this protection com-
pletely, since it might assist in obtaining a more accurate view of the
truth and would help to alleviate the natural disadvantage the inmate faces
in such a hearing.
The major reason given for denying confrontation of adverse witnesses
and cross-examination is that these practices would tend to place the in-
mate and official on the same level, to the detriment of the institution.
Such practices, however, have not proven troublesome in the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, where they now operate4 13 Moreover, the Task Force Report
recommends that these procedures are appropriate, particularly since they
might help achieve the image of the inmate and the staff working together
in the process of rehabilitation. Indeed, this objection would further evap-
orate if a staff member or a law student represented the inmate because
then the inmate would not directly cross-examine or question a staff mem-
ber.
Although neither the Model Penal Code nor the Manual of Correctional
Standards would require any of these procedural protections, the federal
prisons employ all of them without difficulty in serious disciplinary adjudi-
cations 14 Thus, requiring these procedures would seem to be the better
practice, even if they were not constitutionally mandated. The Task Force
Report forcefully provides the rationale:
Yet it is inconsistent with our whole system of government to grant
* uncontrolled power to any officials, particularly over the lives of per-
sons. The fact that a person has been convicted of a crime should not
mean that he has forfeited all rights to demand that he be fairly treated
by officials....
[Moreover, al person who receives what he considers unfair treatment from
correctional authorities is likely to become a difficult subject for reforma-
tion. And the "collaborative regime" advocated in this volume is one
which seeks to maximize the participation of the offender in decisions
which concern him, one which seeks to encourage self-respect and inde-
pendence in preparing offenders for life in the community.
Where such charges may lead to a substantial loss of good time and a
resultant increase in the actual length of imprisonment, the prisoner should
be given reasonable notice of the charges, full opportunity to present
evidence and to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. ..4
412 This reason was suggested by Judge Wyzanski in Nolan v. Scafaii, 306 F. Supp. 1 (D.
Mass. 1969).
413 Hirshkop and Millemann, supra note 395, at 834.
414 id.
415 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 83,86.
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5. Record Keeping and Review
A recorded hearing and review go together because without any record
an administrator could not adequately review a board decision. In addi-
tion, records of previous hearings would probably be of assistance in meting
out punishment in any new hearing. Many systems now provide for such
a record and review. Currently, decisions are appealable to the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons416 in federal prison hearings, to the warden or as-
sociate wardens in Missouri,417 and to the warden in Rhode Island.4 1" Thus,
it does not appear that any insurmountable practical problems bar these
practices. Moreover, such review would seem to provide a greater sense
of fairness to the hearing and consequently be an aid in achieving the col-
laborative regime. Nevertheless, as long as the reviewing individual is a
prison official, review would seem to be of minimal value if the evidence
to be disregarded was the word of a staff member because of the same rea-
sons that a substantial evidence requirement would be ineffective. But the
power to alter or commute any punishments does not seem to be quite so
burdened.
IX. VISITORS
A. The Present State of the Law
Visitation rights of prisoners have been generally left to the discretion
of the warden as a privilege and not a right. Normally, "visitors generally
must be on the inmate's approved visitors' list ' 419 and usually the visita-
tion list is nearly identical to the inmate's "correspondence list."4 "0  Thus,
The Iowa Code requires that certain state officials and religious leaders be
allowed to visit the state correctional institutions .... Other persons may
visit only with the permission of the Warden . .. . All Iowa institutions
limit visitors to individuals on the inmate's approved correspondence list.
These are individuals who are carefully screened in terms of security and
character before they are placed on the list. Rules [prohibit] physical con-
tact and the giving of gifts... *421
For the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Walpole, the Inmate Rules
and Regulations state:
Visits are considered a privilege, not a right, and violation of any rule
governing the visiting room shall be cause for suspension of visiting priv-
ileges. You will be permitted two visits a week from your relatives and
friends, each visit not to exceed one hour. All visits are subject to the ap-
416 Jacob, supra note 53, at 242.
417 Id. at 244 nA5.
418 Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
419 Jacob, supra note 53, at 240.
420 Note, supra note 58, at 682. See IOWA CoDE § 246.46 (1969).
421 Note, supra note 58, at 681-82.
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proval of the Superintendent .... You must conduct yourself with dignity
while in the visiting room so you are cautioned against bodily contact.
Your conversations should be modulated so as not to annoy othersA3-
Just as at Walpole and in Iowa, many strict rules govern visitation behav-
ior elsewhere.
Many institutions further restrict visiting privileges by insisting that both
the inmate and the visitor conform to certain modes of behavior. Thus,
in Tennessee during a visit, "No foreign language will be spoken." And,
"Embracing, handshaking or other body contact with a visitor is forbid-
den." 423
The case law in this area is sparse and seemingly places no limitation
on a prison official's discretionary grant or denial of visitation. In fact,
only one case has been found where visitation was considered a right or
where a denial of visitation privileges was overturned. 2 4 There is also
one reported decision in which a court implied a reasonableness test. In
Davis v. Superior Court,42 5 the court discussed the warden's restriction of
access to death row inmate Caryl Chessman. In dicta the court stated:
Alin absolute isolation of those incarcerated in a penal institution by a
ban on communication by them with the outside population would consti-
tute an unreasonable exercise of ... power .... Reasonable rules pro-
hibiting visitations or communication will stand.42 0
During 1971 another case involving visitation rights was decided and the
court ordered substantially greater visitation opportunities to the inmates
than they previously had enjoyed4 27  In Jones v. Vittenbcrg"' the court
declared that conditions in the Lucas County, Ohio, jail subjected the in-
mates therein to cruel and unusual punishment. One of the many un-
satisfactory conditions which the court found was the jail's visitation policy.
The court noted that:
Visitation is very highly limited. Prisoners are permitted visits only on
Saturday afternoons from one to four o'clock p.m. Visits by children un-
der eighteen are not permitted. All visits must be conducted by convers-
ing through the heavy screening of the cell-blocks, with both parties stand-
4 2
- HARVARD PRISON LEGAL ASSISTANcE PROJECr TRA NUNG MANUAL at 67. This is an
excerpt from the prison rules which are given to the inmates at NValpole Prison in Massachu-
setts.
4 23 Jacob, supra note 53, at 240.
424 United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (ED. Pa. 1967).
425 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959).
4 2 6 Id. at 20, 345 P.2d at 521.
427 InSeale v. Manson, 9 CR. L. REP. 2209 (D. Conn. May 5, 1971), Bobby Sale and Erika
Huggins contended, inter alia, that as unconvicted detainees they had a constitutional right to
correspond with and to see friends and business associates without restriction. The court re-
jected this claim and also held that the plaintiffs had no constitutional right to be interviemcd by
members of the press. The court specifically noted that unfettered mail and visitation privi!eg
would seriously hamper prison security and discipline.
42s 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ing, usually in groups of as many as three prisoners at a time. There is no
semblance of any privacy. Trustees have somewhat greater visiting priv-
ileges.4 29
In a subsequent decision, rendered after a further hearing concerning the
relief to which plaintiffs were entitled, the court ordered, inter alia:
Establishment of visiting programs, which shall include daily visiting
hours, both in the daytime ,and in the evening, and especially upon holi-
days and weekends; the provision of much more adequate physical facil-
ities for visitation; removal of the limitations on visits by children and by
persons not members of the prisoner's immediate family; and provisions
for limitation or removal of visiting privileges for disciplinary purposes,
or for abuse of visiting privileges. 430
B. Analyses and Suggested Practice
The Coffin view in this area of inmate rights fits very closely with the
Task Force Report's notion of the "collaborative regime," in which both
inmates and staff structure themselves in a "partnership... in the process
of rehabilitation. '4 11 Such a concept
tries to oppose the tendency for an institution to bccome isolated from
the community physically and in terms of values, and instead seeks to as-
similate inmates in normal noncriminal ways of life, partly through close
identification with staff and partly through increased communication with
the outside community. 432
This should be done only with such minimal additional rules as are essen.
tial to meet the conditions peculiar to the institution.43 3 Certainly visita-
tion increases communication with the outside and should for this reason
be encouraged. One would suppose that there should be strong reasons
for denying visitation.
Proceeding under a Coffin rationale, one would reason that a sentence
of imprisonment does "by necessary implication" withdraw the right of
freedom of movement and implies close confinement. Consequently, re-
lease of the prisoner for furlough, for work, or for conjugal visits" 4 is not
the kind of visitation right which an inmate retains while incarcerated, at
least as long as he remains within the traditional type of custodial prison.
This presumes, of course, that there would be no equal protection problems
in which such opportunities were granted to some but not to all inmates
within a particular classification.
429 Id. at 96.
430 330 F. Supp. 707, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
431 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 47.
4321d.
4331d. at 50.
434 For a case sustaining the denial of such a right see Payne v. Dist. of Columbia, 253 F.2d
867 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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But what about visits to the inmate while he is in the institution? Un-
doubtedly, in most cases visitation increases chances of rehabilitation and
helps to avoid the situation where "the traditional prison and many juve-
nile training schools [which are isolated, punitive, and regimented] develop
a monolithic society, caste-like and resistive to change."4 5 Increased visi-
tation which reduces isolation from the community follows the Crime Com-
mission's recommendation that "Liberalization of policies governing visits
and letters for inmates is also helpful and can be used even for inmates
who cannot be released.""4 6  Moreover, restrictions or denial of visitation
curtails rights of the visitors who wish to see inmates. This consideration
indicates that visitation rights are not properly denied at the whim of pris-
on administrators.
One commentator suggests that the due process clause appears
to require that the warden's prohibition of visitors be reasonable. Arbi-
trary restrictions or the denial of all visitors, in the absence of compelling
security reasons, would constitute abuse of this discretion.43 7
Such a view seems appropriate in the prison context. Exceptions eveni to
the test of reasonableness, however, would seem to exist for visitation by
ministers and attorneys. Visiting rights in these cases should be absolute.a"
Of course, even these visits would be subject to reasonable regulation as
to time and place in order to protect the state's legitimate interest in the
smooth administration of the prison-unless an emergency arose in which
the attorney might require immediate access to the inmate.
General visitation rights should not be taken from a prisoner arbitrarily;
a prison sentence does not imply or necessitate such a practice. Reasonable
regulation of visiting privileges involves at least the following considera-
,tions: (1) space available in the prison, (2) meal hours, (3) normal work
schedules, (4) staff available to search visitors for contraband and weap-
ons (just as in mail cases), and (5) time of day. All of these are valid
considerations in regulating the time, place, and number of visitors, but
this regulation certainly must be rationally related to the end sought and
does not provide justification to prohibit visitation altogether or to restrict
people who could visit. Perhaps in unusual cases an official could offer suf-
ficient additional reasons for excluding a person from visitation, but a gen-
eral restriction, such as no persons with criminal records or no female visi-
tors who are not a wife, sister, or mother, appears unwarranted. Although
visits by certain persons might be detrimental to rehabilitation, the position
that visitation by anyone of a certain class will always have a detrimental ef-
fect on an inmate cannot be justified. Moreover, the Coffin view would re-
4 35 TAsK FORcE REPORT, supra note 11, at 46.
436Id. at 56.
437 Note, supra note 58, at 682.
438 These rights are discussed in Section II on Religion beginning at note 72 supra and in
Section III on Access to the Courts beginning at note 128 supra.
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quire prison officials to demonstrate why a visit by a particular individual
would be detrimental to the inmate before they could prohibit it.
Another consideration relevant to visitation is the nature of the prison.
A minimum security institution would obviously need fewer restrictions on
visitation than one housing men who are disciplinary problems. Perhaps
the most difficult question in this area is whether misbehavior by an inmate
is sufficient reason to curtail visitation, at least for some time period.43'
Since it is evident that an official should not be able to eliminate visitation
entirely, visitation should be viewed as a right subject to due process limi-
tations and not merely a privilege.440  After all, instead of eliminating visi-
tation, the authorities can employ a variety of other disciplinary measures
which do not curtail a retained right or eliminate a practice beneficial to
rehabilitation. The better practice would be to allow the deprivation of
visitation only when the misbehavior relates to the visit itself, and then
only temporarily. Perhaps that power should be left to the reasonable dis-
cretion of the officials, but there is no valid reason why courts should be
reluctant to scrutinize any decision which hinders visitation beyond rea-
sonable limits, especially if the burden of justifying such a decision prop-
erly rests with the official.
X. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE TREATMIENT
A. Rehabilitation: A Goal to Corrections
The focus of this volume .. .is on rehabilitative treatment, and spe-
cifically on methods for reintegrating the offender into the community ....
. .. The ultimate goal of corrections under any theory is to make the
community safer by reducing the incidence of crime. Rehabilitation of of-
fenders to prevent their return to crime is in general the most promising
way to achieve this end.441
Reformation has long occupied a place in correctional theory as one
of the ends of imprisonment. It was in the late eighteenth century that
correctional theory began to emphasize two new ends of imprisonment:
"One of these was humanitarianism .... The other was reformation.... "n
Today, though, the major purpose of incarceration seems to be rehabilita-
tion of the offender.443 However, there is no judicially recognized right
439See the court's order in Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), which
adopted this practice.
4 4 0 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilego Distinction in Constitutional Lai,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
441 TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 11, at 16.
442 Id. at 3.
443 "While the constitutional prohibition in the Eighth Amendment against cruel and tin.
usual punishment is something which only recently has drawn particular attention, there ig no
question that rehabilitation, not revenge, must be the principle aim of penology." Nolan v.
Smith, Nos. 6228, 6272 (D. Vt. June 29, 1971). See also Brown v. Peyton, 8 CR. L. REP. 2367
(4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1971).
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of a prisoner to receive treatment or to have the state make any effort
toward his rehabilitation. Recognition of such a right would provide im-
petus for the treatment of offenders and for their reform and ultimate re-
turn to society as productive members of the community.
B. The Right to Treatment in Other Areas
In the past few years a number of courts have begun to recognize that
a right to treatment exists for certain groups of people who have been de-
prived of their liberty. Initially, the right was limited to criminally com-
mitted mental patients444 and juvenile offenders 4   In Rouse v. Cam-
eron,44 the first case to recognize the existence of this right, the plaintiff
was an inmate of a mental hospital who had been involuntarily committed
after acquittal by reason of insanity for the offense of carrying a pistol.
The court held that he had a right to receive treatment and remanded the
case for a hearing and findings as to whether the plaintiff was receiving
adequate treatment. This decision was based primarily upon a statutory
right to treatment expressed in the 1964 District of Columbia Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally Ill Act.447 A year later, the same court decided two
cases dealing with juvenile offenders. In Creek v. Stone, 4 s the appellant
had been arrested and sent to a juvenile home to await trial. The court
liberally interpreted the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act44' to place
the state in the position of parens patriae and said that the rehabilitative
purposes of the statute comprehended psychiatric care04r Then, in In to
Elmore,45 1 a case in which a 15 year old offender claimed that he was not
receiving treatment, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hear-
ing, indicating that:
[Slhould it develop that the need for professional care persists, the Ju-
venile Court will then proceed to evaluate the present confinement in light
of the standards announced in Creek, utilizing its expertise and discretion
secure in the knowledge that it is amply authorized to fulfill the rehabili-
tative purposes of the Act.4Y 2
Since these early decisions, the right to treatment has received much
4-4 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Maanllah v. Warden, 86 Nev. 430,
470 P.2d 122 (1970).
44 In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
446 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
447D. C. CODE ENcycL. ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
448 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
449 D. C. CODE ExcycL. ANN. § 16-2316(3) (Supp. V, 1966).
450 379 F.2d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
451382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
452 Id. at 128. For a recent controversy involving treatment under the District of Columbia
Youth Corrections Act, see United States v. Lowery, 10 CR L REP. 2195 (D.D.C. Dec. 10,
1971); United States v. Alsbrook, 10 CR L REP. 2185 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 1971).
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comment4 53 and subsequent decisions have enlarged it to include one sen-
tenced to an indefinite term as a sex offender, 45 4 a civilly committed men-
tal patient,4 55 and one who had been judged incompetent to stand trial
and confined to a mental hospital.4"  Additionally, one court dismissed a
prayer for a mandatory injunction compelling an effective rehabilitation
program for chronic alcoholics only because it held that a state could com,
ply with constitutional requirements by electing not to confine them.457
C. Approaching a Right to Treatment For Inmates
A few cases have been litigated in which persons housed in regular
prisons have claimed the right to treatment, but all have involved either
juveniles or persons who had in some way been declared mentally ill. In
Pennsylvania, two boys, who were adjudged defective delinquents with
criminal tendencies and were incarcerated in the State Correctional Institu-
tion at Dallas, brought suit alleging a lack of treatraent.418 The court re-
jected their claim of a right to receive treatment and held that treatment
was not required because the boys were confined in a penal institution.
The court distinguished Rouse on the grounds that -the "constitutional dis-
cussion in Rouse is dictum only since the court really relied on a federal
statute requiring that persons 'hospitalized in a public hospital for mental
illness' receive medical and psychiatric care.' '4 0  It appears that the court
ignored the parens patriae notion contained in the juvenile sentencing
process, on which the District of Columbia court relied in both Creek and
Elmare. A contrary result was seemingly reached in a 1970 case in which
an inmate of a Nevada state prison obtained a hearing to determine if he
was getting proper treatment under a statute committing him for "deten-
tion and psychiatric treatment" after he had been found insane and unable
to stand trial.460 The court noted that "[treatment is not a matter of dis-
cretion and apparently may be forced by appropriate order." 401
Finally, one other case considered the issue of treatment for an inmate
and discussed briefly the right to treatment and rehabilitation of one sen-
tenced under a criminal statute and transferred to a mental hospital. In
United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,411 a habeas corpus action by a New
453 See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon]; Note, Civil Restraint, fental Illners, and the Right to Treat.
ment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
454 People v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 2d 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1965).
455 Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
4 5 6Nason v. Supt. of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N..2d 908 (1968).
457 Rakes v. Coleman, 8 CR. L. REP. 2056 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 1970).
4 58 Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 44,246 A.2d 356 (1968).
459 Id. at 61, 246 A.2d at 365.
460Maatallah v. Warden, 86 Nev. 430, 432, 470 P.2d 122, 123 (1970).
461 Id. at 433, 470 P.2d at 123.
462 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
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York state prisoner challenging the legality of his transfer from Clinton
Prison to Dannemora State Hospital, the inmate raised the issue of his right
to receive treatment. The court said that although a procedural barrier pre-
vented it from deciding this "highly significant question" and
[w~hile these cases [Rouse and Creek, inter alia] deal with persons
who are not currently under a sentence of imprisonment as Schuster is, it
may be that this difference in and of itself does not provide an adequate
basis for denying him the same protections. The incidence of having been
convicted of a crime surely does not deprive a person of all constitutional
protections for the duration of his sentence .... While we do not pass
upon the possibility of such a constitutional right to treatment, we are of
the view that... the state may wish to ree.amine the validity of its con-
finement of Schuster... 463
Even though many of the cases cited above dealt with a statutory basis
for the right to receive treatment, the reasons for such a right are generally
as applicable to prisoners as to mental, juvenile, or sex offenders. Indeed,
recent comments by Judge Bazelon, author of Rouse, are in many ways ap-
plicable to the prisoner's case, even though he admits that on some grounds
prisoners situations may be distinguishable.
The rationale for the right to treatment is dear. If society confines a
man for the benevolent purpose of helping him ... then its right to so
withhold his freedom depends entirely upon whether help is in fact pro-
vided.... But whenever care is simply custodial, we must be certain be-
yond a reasonable doubt . . . that the individual truly could not hope to
care for himself.... Whatever justification we may find in theories of ret-
ribution or general deterrence for confining a convicted criminal, the case
is quite different when the individual has committed no crime....
...Courts cannot force legislatures to provide adequate resources for
treatment. But neither should they play handmaiden to the social hypoc-
risy which rationalizes confinement by a false promise of treatment....
... When the legislature justifies confinement by a promise of treatment,
it thereby commits the community to provide the resources necessary to
fulfill the promise.464
With a major goal of incarceration being rehabilitation "to prevent
their return to crime," any recognition of a right to treatment for inmates
could make the community realize that it is "committed to provide the re-
sources" which it is not now furnishing to prisoners. Furthermore, rec-
ognition of this right could enable the courts to direct administrative of-
ficials to provide training, counselling, education, and other rehabilitative
services. Moreover, a threat of possible release by habeas corpus might
provide a sufficient impetus to legislatures to increase resources for correc-
43 Id. at 1088.
464 Bazelon, supra note 453, at 748-49.
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tional rehabilitation programs.4 65 Even though there is no single program
generally recognized for successful rehabilitation of offenders, a program
could certainly be provided which was "within the range of appropriate
treatment alternatives." Since no program of treatment or rehabilitation
can in any way guarantee successful results to the inmates, the right to
treatment must comprehend only the right to participate in a reasonable
treatment program provided by the prison. Such a program must certainly
include the medical treatment of drug addiction because that is a major rea-
son for criminal behavior. Therefore, the rehabilitative goal of incarcera-
tion suggests that an inmate has a right to receive some form of treatment
because he has lost his freedom for just this purpose.
D. Statutory Authority
Many would point out, however, that the treatment cases which have
recognized such a right have all been at least partially based upon statute.
But few have recognized that there does exist a strong basis in correctional
statutes, both federal466 and state,40 7 for the recognition of an incarcerated
4 6 5 See 84 HARv. L. REv. 456, at 462-63 (1970), where it is suggested that a threat of pos.
sible release of Arkansas inmates spurred legislative action.
466 Statutes dealing with the federal correctional system speak of the purposes and goals of
the federal prisons.
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970): The Attorney General may establish and conduct industries,
farms, and other activities and classify the inmates; and provide for their proper gov-
ernment, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformition.
18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970): The Federal penal and correctionaO institution shall be so
planned ... as to facilitate the development of an integrated system which will assure
... such other factors as should be considered in providing an individualized system
of discipline, care, and treatment of the persons committed....
18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) (1970):
The Attorney General, when the Director shall certify that proper and adequate treat.
ment facilities and personnel are available, is hereby authorized to contract with the
proper officials of a State or Territory for the custody, care, subsistence, education,
treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenes....
467 Various state statutes provide even more clearly that a major legislative purpose of the
state correctional system is rehabilitation and direct that it be provided. The Vermont statutes
are probably the ones most clearly authorizing such a right. These purposes are set forth in a
special act which was passed in 1966.
State correctional policy, 1966, No. 24, § 1:
The State of Vermont intends to develop its correctional institutions and programs on
the policy basis that society is best and most effectively served by the adoption of a
correctional program designed to:
(1) Protect persons and property against violators of criminal laws.
(2) Deal with violators of criminal laws with treatment designed to prepare
and induce them to become useful citizens of the state and community, foster their
human dignity, and preserve the community's human resources.
This policy is based upon the cumulative experience of modern correctional practice which
undertakes to build sound correctional programs to square with the facts that, first, almost all
criminal violators do return to the open society and, second, that triditional institutional prisons
not only fail to reform or rehabilitate but operate to increase the risk of continued criminal
acts following release. It is recognized that sole or even primary reliance upon closed, custodial
institutions is self-defeating and also results in wasteful high costs to the taxpayers of the state,
The alternative is a comprehensive program which, while providing necessary closed custodial
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offender's right to treatment and rehabilitation. In many instances such a
statutory right is as dear as the one recognized in Rouse or even stronger
than the one in the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, which pro-
vided only that the state held the juvenile as if it were a parent.
E. The Rationale for a Right to Treatment
Society sentences an offender partially in an attempt to cure his criminal
habits and legislatures have indicated that the prisoner is to receive treat-
ment and to benefit from rehabilitative programs. In both the juvenile
and mental offender areas, these same factors have provided sufficient basis
for a judicially recognized right to treatment.4t Indeed, in all three in-
stances there is the same interest in protecting society by confining a person
who is deemed to be dangerous and whose behavior needs modification.
If all this is true, how can the prisoner's situation be distinguished from that
of the juvenile or mental offender?
Only two of the incarcerative purposes, 6 9 deterrence and vengeance,
would seem to distinguish the cases. But is this enough to deprive the
inmate of a right to receive therapy and treatment and perhaps of his re-
confinement for hardened and habitual offenders, will implement as its primary objective the
disciplined preparation of violators for their responsible roles in the open community.
Such a program, calculated to serve that objective, will have many parts. A range of facil-
ities for the treatment of different classes of offenders is necessary. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §
101 (1970) (historical note). Vermont is not the only such state. In fact, many statutes pro-
vide for rehabilitation and treatment, for example, Delaware and Ohio.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 (Supp. 1970):
§ 6501. A Department of Correction is established to provide for the treatment, re-
habilitation and restoration of offenders as useful, lawabiding citizens within the com-
munity.
§ 6517(a). The Commissioner shall carry out and provide for The custody, study,
training, treatment, correction and rehabilitation of persons committed to the Depart-
ment.§ 6531. Persons committed to the institutional care of the Department shall be dealt
with humanely, with effort directed to their rehabilitation, to effect their return to the
community as safely and promptly as practicable. The Commissioner shall establish
the following programs ... education, including vocational training, work-, case work
counselling and pyschotherapy....
OMO REv. CODE ANN. (Page 1970):
§ 5145.03. The department of mental hygiene and correction ... shall make such
rules and regulations for the government of prisoners as tend to promote their reforma-
tion, or be necessary for the purpose of sections 5145.01 to 5145.27, inclusive, of the
Revised Code.
§ 5145.04. The department ... shall maintain such control over prisoners committed
to its custody as may prevent them from committing crime, secure their self-support,
and accomplish their reformation.
§ 5119.17. Persons sentenced or committed to any institution ... are committed to
the control, care, and custody of such department... Mhe chief of the division ...
shall assign such person to a suitable state institution or place maintained by the state
within his division, there to be confined, cared for, treated, trained, and rehabilitated
until released ....
See also ARi. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-100 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10S, § 10 (Smith-Hard
1972); N.Y. CoRlREC. LAw §§ 70-71 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
468 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 n.30 (1967).
469See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11.
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turn as a useful member of society? The usefulness of deterrence in incar-
ceration would seem to be more in the length of confinement and in the
Icertainty of apprehension, rather than whether or not an inmate is provided
,reasonable treatment. Consequently, vengeance in denying treatment re-
mains as the only interest weighing against treatment. Although the cost
of any treatment program is a valid consideration, it is a legislative prob-
lem that exists also for the other groups. At least in the states where the
legislature has already made a statutory commitment to treatment, it would
seem that costs would not completely deny this right, for "[w]hen the
legislature justifies confinement by a promise of treatment, it thereby com-
mits the community to provide the resources necessary to fulfill the prom-
ise." 47 0
If the Coffin view of prisoners' rights is followed, it becomes apparent
that the differences between adult prisoners and juveniles or mental pa.
tients cannot be enough to deprive the inmates of reasonable treatment ef-
forts, for certainly it is not implicit in confinement that an inmate must
be deprived of the opportunities to educate, train, and rehabilitate himself.
Instead, it is often made explicit that he is to receive such treatment. More-
over, since the primary goal of incarceration is to rehabilitate the offender,
the purposes of incarceration, except perhaps the vengeance of society, are
not served by the denial of rehabilitative programs. Therefore, with the
existence of an adequate legal theory to justify a prisoner's right to receive
treatment471 and with the obvious fact that society could only gain from
470 Bazelon, supra note 453, at 749.
471 Some recent cases suggest an alternative approach to the establishment of a right to treat.
ment; namely, that the eighth amendment implies that incarceration is cruel and unusual punish.
ment if the prison does not provide at least some reasonable level of treatment facilities. Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) held the conditions in the Arkansas prison sys.
tra constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The lack of rehabilitation services and facilities
was considered "a factor in the overall constitutional equation before the Court." 309 F. Supp.
at 379. In Bryant v. Hendrick, 7 CiL L. REP. 2463 (Phil. Ct. C.P., Pa., Aug. 11, 1970), a
case closely paralleling Holt, the court held that conditions in Holmsberg prison violated the
eighth amendment. The court particularly noted as a portion of the evidence affecting its deci-
sion "the lack of any rehabilitation program" at 2463. Thus, one sees as a seminal theory of
constitutional law that failure to provide rehabilitation and treatmeit may be a cruel and unusual
punishment, particularly if other factors in prison are detrimental to the prisoner's rehabil.
itation. Consistent with this line of reasoning the court in Holt indicated that:
The absence of an affirmative program of training and rehailitation may have con-
stitutional significance where in the absence of such a program conditions and prac.
tices exist which actually militate against reform and rehabilitation.
309 F. Supp. at 379. A recent Harvard Law Review case note implies that at a minimum the
state has a duty to provide an inmate with rehabilitative services, consistent with the theories of
Holt and Bryant:
To hold that an absence of rehabilitation efforts constitute; cruel and unusual pun.
ishment would be to read a particular theory of criminal punishment into the Consti-
tution. Yet present recidivism rates make it seem highly doubtful that a state should
be free to experiment with a penal program that offers no rehabilitation whatsoever.
Imprisonment in an environment practically guaranteed to make the prisoner less use-
ful to himself and society hardly seems humane or functional, though it occurs all too
frequently.
84 HARV. L. REv. 456 at 461-62. This theory is given additional support by the concurrence
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,recognition of it, is it not time for our courts to recognize the right to re-
habilitative treatment?
XI. CONCLUSION
One of the themes recurring through the sections of this article has
been that prisoners are no longer slaves of the state 7-2 and that correctional
officials must justify practices which curb their rights and are not essential
for their physical custody. It is asserted that the movement toward in-
creased judicial intervention and the acceptance of the Coffin notion of
retained rights are desirable trends, for in many instances the resulting
greater freedom enhances rehabilitation and comes closer to achieving the
desired "'collaborative regime."1 3  Moreover, in many of these areas of
prison law the test for deciding what is "by necessary implication '4T4 taken
from an inmate has emerged as a kind of balancing process, which weighs
inmate interests against realistic correctional needs. Application of this
kind of analysis to prison law indicates that inmates' rights should be ex-
panded and that prison officials must accommodate this change. Only when
a legitimate correctional interest can be put forward for withdrawing a
right and not be outweighed by other interests can the deprivation of that
right be justified. What then are the proper limits on inmate rights and
what values justify the abrogation of individual rights in the prison set-
ting?
First, in some instances it would be sufficient to demonstrate by reasons
or facts upon which a court can independently pass that a certain practice
would cause a danger of substantial disruption of the normal prison func-
tion or that it is likely to lead to disorder or altercations. Nevertheless,
such a showing should meet a strict test: in the first amendment area that
includes the exercise of religious belief, possession of literature, and cen-
sorship of mail; the test would be one of a clear and present danger of
physical disorder. Perhaps in the area of racial discrimination, like reli-
gious belief, no sufficient justification for withdrawal of a right can be as-
serted. At least as strict as "dear and present danger" is needed to out-
of Judge Lay in the Eighth Circuit's affirmance of the district court's holding in Holt v. Sarver,
442 F.2d 304, 310 (1971) where he states: 'Until immediate and continued emphasis is given
to an affirmative program of rehabilitation the district court should retain jurisdiction."
Finally, other cases in which violations of the eighth amendment have been found support this
theory. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), where the court founI
"no attempt at rehabilitation' and McCray v. State, 10 CR. L REP. 2131 (Montgomery County
Cir. Ct. App., Aid., 1971), in which it was noted that an institution for defective delinquents
must not retard rehabilitation. See also Nolan v. Smith, Nos. 6223, 6272 (D. Vt. June 29,
1971), where a lack of rehabilitative facilities was a factor in a finding of unconstitutional in-
carceration.
472 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
473 TASK ForcE REPOrT, supra note 11, at 47-50.
474 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
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weigh the strong commands of equal protection in racial discrimination
cases.
Unfortunately, in the vast majority of cases involving the suppression
of inmate rights, the asserted justification is that the practice would disrupt
internal discipline and security. Thus, in a visitation case for example,
the reason offered for prohibiting visits might be a lack of guards to pre-
serve order. Nearly always, however, officials do not clearly demonstrate
or prove that substantial disruption would occur, but rather only make
such an assertion. It is significant that a reason seldom offered is that
suppression of an alleged right will benefit an inmate's rehabilitation or that
permitting the practice would adversely influence a program that is part
of the overall treatment scheme.
Second, cost by itself has also been rejected as a sufficiently strong in-
terest to justify removal of any of the rights discussed above; for in the
-current areas of litigation, inmate demands have not been prohibitively
costly. Reasonable medical care, the provision of an adequate number of
legal books in the inmate library, employment of ministers, the presence of
an impartial outside adjudicator in disciplinary hearings, or special diets
are not so costly to the state that they outweigh the interests dictating their
provision. Additionally, when constitutional values are present, arguments
that a practice is an administrative burden or that it involves great admin-
istrative costs (such as in the provision of procedural safeguards in the dis-
ciplinary process or in the work involved in the coordination of religious
diets or visitation) simply cannot justify the suppre.sion of a right, partic-
ularly if the practice can be administered in a way that eliminates the bur-
den on the exercise of the right.475  Consequently, administrative discre-
tion must no longer be regarded as a justification for disallowing such
rights as the provision of reasonable medical care, visitation, mail, or due
process. Rather, administrative discretion must be permitted only inasmuch
as it reasonably regulates the time, place, frequency, or degree of exercise
of these rights.
Absolute prohibition is no longer a viable alternative; and in some
areas in which special values are present, such as access to the courts, reli-
gious or political beliefs, emergency medical care, or punishment that is so
base as to be cruel and unusual, the prison officials should carry a very
heavy burden to justify their actions.
Furthermore, considering the areas in which prisoners' rights have been
recognized and considering the preferred values of the first amendment,
there are other rights that have not yet been granted the inmate but are
ones that he must certainly retain. These are the freedoms of expression
dealing with speech, press, and protest. Indeed, why have these freedoms
not yet been recognized; they are no less favored than other first amend-
475 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ment values. These rights undoubtedly encompass at least the right to an
unfettered press, to nondisruptive speech, and to peaceful protest, at least
when it does not involve disruption of the prison routine.
Perhaps a situation very analogous to inmates' rights has already been
considered in another developing area of the law, student rights. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Distic 70 school officials sought
to prohibit a peaceful protest which consisted of the wearing of a black arm-
band by students in protest of the Vietnam war. The reason offered for
the prohibition was that it was needed to prevent the disturbance of school
discipline. The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this asserted justi-
fication, even though it noted favorably the necessity for authority to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools477-a necessity that similarly
exists in the prisons.
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. ... Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a dis-
turbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk... 478
Although it is dear that reasonable regulation of speech-connected activ-
ities, including protest, is permitted in carefully restricted circumstances, 47'
any restriction of rights encompassed by freedom of expression should be
strictly scrutinized by the courts. Such a position has already been stated
by courts in the cases that have applied the dear and present danger test
to the possession of nonreligious literature.480 Consequently, with the
trend toward increased judicial protection of inmate rights, one would ex-
pect that this same protection would be extended into the first amendment
areas of speech, press, and protest, just as in the student's rights area, at
least when any action is "entirely divorced from actually or potentially dis-
ruptive conduct by those participating in it."48' Alert correctional officials
-and more correctly, the legistatives that control them--could save a
great deal of effort by anticipating tlils latent area of litigation and the de-
velopment of the law which is almost certain to occur.
Examination of the plethora of cases involving prisoners' rights, partic-
ularly with the ballooning number in the last few years, reveals that time
and time again the same questions are litigated--oftentimes within the
same jurisdiction. 82 This suggests that correctional officials are slow to
476 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4771d. at 507.
478 Id. at 508.
479 Id. at 513.
480 See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Fortune Socety v. McGin-
nis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
481 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
482 An example of this phenomenon recently occurred in the courts of the First Circuit. In
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adopt new practices and procedures consonant with the developing law and
that they must be prodded into doing so. Indeed, the administrators seem
almost afraid of litigation and do not seem to understand the law or the
implications to be drawn from it. Thus, it would certainly benefit all
concerned if they could either anticipate the development of the law or at
least attempt to conform their practices to recent court rulings without the
necessity of litigating the same issues time and time again in numerous ju-
risdictions. This practice would decrease the load on the courts, absorb
less administrative time of the prison in litigation, and presumably help
the inmates. Consequently, it would be desirable to adopt precedures that
would make correctional officials more aware of recent legal developments.
Although any real discussion of how officials could be made more aware
of the development of correctional law lies outside the scope of this article,
the possibilities include promulgation of regulations governing specific areas
of correctional practice, perhaps in the form of a model correctional pro-
cedure, or distribution of guidance manuals, which would suggest how
practices should be altered to conform to recent developments. Perhaps
an even more desirable change would be to hire legal personnel to work
in prisons because they could provide greater flexibility than written rules.
Some programs like these have already been instituted in various correc-
tional systems and more of them might provide ways to fill the gap in legal
the summer of 1970 the Court of Appeals held that Daniel Nolan's mail to the A.C.L.U. could
not be stopped. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). In the early fall of the same
year the District Court for Rhode Island ordered wholesale changes in the state prison's mail
regulations, including a prohibition on interference with mail to courts and attorneys. Palml-
giano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). Yet in early 1971 the District Court
for Massachusetts had to order that Michael Meola's mail to the courts could not be withheld
or censored. Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971). The warden at Walpole
told Donald Linky, a member of the Harvard Voluntary Defenders, soon after this case that he
interpreted the court order to apply only to Meola's mail. (This was learned from a conversa-
tion the author had with Mr. Linky.) A few weeks later the Massachusetts District Court
ordered that Ben Tyree, another Walpole inmate, had a right to seni mail to the courts. Tyree v.
Fitzpatrick, 325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971). In April, 1971, yet another case granted in-
junctive relief against the censorship of correspondence between a Massachusetts inmate and his
attorney. Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971). In Maine a mail censorship case
was partially settled by a consent decree, but prison officials refused to adopt the judge's sugg.es.
tion that they open and inspect inmates' incoming court and attorney mail only in the inmates'
presence. In response, the judge ordered his suggestion adopted. The suit and its consent de-
cree were the catalysts for the adoption of a policy of not censoring inmate-attorney correspon-
dence. Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162 (D. Me. 1971), af'ad, 10 CR. L RE3P. (1st Cir. Jan,
18, 1972). Apparently a new chapter in this story has begun, for this past fall the First Circuit
ordered Massachusetts correctional authorities to permit Daniel Nolan to send letters to the press
concerning prison matters. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 10 CP. L. REP. 2106 (1st Cir. Nov. 4, 1971).
Perhaps much of this litigation could have been avoided if one of the initial suits had been
a class action, which is now permitted by many courts. Although extended discussion of the
merits of a class action is beyond the scope of this article, such suits would certainly assist in pre.
venting situations such as that outlined above. Apparently many courts agree, for the current
majority view seems to be that inmate suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are properly maintainable
as class actions. For opposing views, compare Nolan v. Smith, No. 6228 (D. Vt. June 29,
1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F.
Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio (1971)) with
Heckart v. Pate, 9 CR. L. REP. 2228 (N.D. Ill. April 30, 1971); Shank v. Peterson, 8 Cit. L. REP.
2397 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 1971).
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understanding. If it is unfeasible to hire full or part-time lawyers, then
perhaps law students or members of large firms acting in a pro bono
capacity could offer effective counsel to the administrators. In any event,
a legal education program should not be limited to the warden, but should
extend to every level of prison official including guards, who are most
closely involved in administering the inmate rights.
In addition to recent legal commentary, many cases confirm the fact
that most correctional institutions still operate on custodial principles and
often grossly infringe upon the exercise of many rights. Possibly the very
nature of custodial duties makes it difficult for prison officials to be sensi-
tive to prisoners' interests. Therefore, it may be desirable to establish inde-
pendent bodies to review the operation of regulations within each prison
and to investigate inmate complaints, particularly with respect to alleged
denials of constitutional rights. An independent body, free from any de-
partmental bias could not only review the conformity of prison practices
to the law, but could also consider the desirability of any regulation, its
relationship to rehabilitation, and whether it necessitates the repeated dep-
rivation of a right.
In sum, it is evident that many current correctional practices infringe
upon inmate rights and that the reasons asserted for such practices are in-
sufficient to justify these deprivations. foreover, correctional officials often
do not axhibit an awareness of the developments, which would enable them
to adapt their outmoded practices to the new ideas and legal theories which
view prisoners' rights as being no longer subject to administrative whim.
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